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Interpreting human object-directed action requires infants to gloss over surface
differences in the motion stream between separate action exemplars and extract the
meaning-or gist--of the action. The experiments reported in this dissertation
investigated infants' processing of action for gist. During the habituation phase of each
experiment, infants saw an actor manipulate an object. At test, infants were shown two
perceptually distinct actions in which the actor used a novel hand configuration to
contact-but not manipulate-the object. One test trial depicted an action consistent
with the gist of the habituation action, while the other test trial depicted a gist-
inconsistent action. In question was whether infants would make a generative inference
of what the actor was likely to do with the object in test trials, gloss over surface-level
differences between the habituation and test actions, and categorize together actions that
were similar in gist. It was predicted that infants would demonstrate gist-level processing
by looking longer at gist-inconsistent than gist-consistent test trials. In Experiment 1,5-
vto 7- and 10- to 12-month-olds' gist-level processing of pushing versus pulling actions
was investigated. Experiments 2a and 2b attempted to replicate Experiment 1 using a
modified methodology with a group of 6- to 7- and 11- to 12-month-olds, respectively.
Experiment 3 investigated whether 10- to 12-month-olds, when observing events
involving an actor pushing an object toward a recipient, construe the action at a level of
gist that captures the dyadic nature of the interaction or simply the spatia110cation to
which an object is moved. Experiment 4 investigated whether 10- to 12-month-olds
process the gist of opening and closing actions. Across the set of experiments, 10- to 12-
month-old infants routinely displayed clear-cut evidence of gist-level processing-i.e., at
test, they looked longer at trials depicting a gist-inconsistent action than a gist-consistent
action, despite these actions being equally perceptually dissimilar from actions in
habituation. Data from 5- to 7-month-olds were suggestive of gist-level processing for
some actions. These findings point to infants' ability to interpret action at an abstract
level in the face ofthe rampant perceptual variability inherent in human action.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Overview
The ability to make sense of the behavior of others is a remarkable achievement in
human development. Imagine having a bird's-eye view of the kitchen of a busy
restaurant. A kitchen apprentice juliennes an onion and fillets a salmon. The pastry chef
prepares dough by tossing it in the air, rolling it out on the counter with a rolling pin, and
using her hands to smooth the edges. The sous-chef parboils green beans while pan
searing a steak before placing it in the oven. After the last dinner order of the night
leaves the kitchen, the executive chef opens up the refrigerator door, pulls out a cold
bottle of Guinness, and twists off the cap in order to drink to a night well done.
Despite the ongoing and often frenetic movement, an observer would have little
difficulty interpreting this scene, an impressive .accomplishment that involves a host of
processing mechanisms. When observing behavior, adults segment and extract individual
action units within the ongoing stream of motion (Baldwin, Andersson, Saffran, &
Meyer, 2007; Newtson, 1973; Zacks, 2004) and make inferences about the actors' goals,
intentions, beliefs, and other mental states (Holbrook, 2007; Malle, 2004; Meltzoff,
1995). Individual action units are also organized hierarchically (Hard, Tversky, & Lang,
2006; Jackendoff, 2007; Zacks, Tversky, & Iyer, 2001; Zacks & Tversky, 2001) such that
2a general goal-e.g., to prepare a dough-is broken down into sub-goals such as mixing
the ingredients and kneading the dough.
Within the past decade, a growing literature has begun to elucidate the
development of these abilities in infancy. Baldwin and colleagues (Baldwin, Baird,
Saylor, & Clark, 2001), for instance, found that when viewing a kitchen clean-up scene,
10- and II-month-old infants parsed the ongoing stream of motion into individual units.
Importantly, those units were located at natural junctures in the action which
corresponded to breakpoints between separate intentional acts. Not only are infants
capable of segmenting actions, but, by I2-months-of-age, infants who see two actions
occur in a causal sequence interpret the first action as related to the eventual goal
achieved by the second action (Woodward & Sommerville, 2000), an ability which may
represent a first step in hierarchical representation of action. These studies are part of a
large body of research supporting the contention that several critical developments in
infants' ability to interpret observed behavior occur within the first year of life.
There is, however, an additional skill that has been the topic ofless research, but
which is critical to interpreting human action that; namely, the ability to recognize that
two or more perceptually dissimilar behaviors can all have the same goal or meaning.
Consider again the kitchen scene described above. The sous-chef engages in two very
different actions-briefly placing green beans in boiling water and searing a steak in a
frying pan-which are similar in their attempt to partially cook a food item in preparation
for additional cooking procedures. Likewise, the executive chef uses two very different
kinds ofmovements-a yank of the arm directed at the refrigerator door and a twist of
3the wrist directed at the bottle cap-to accomplish the same functional act of opening a
container.
The above scenm10 highlights a tension between attending to local surface details
of the motion stream on the one hand, and forming more abstract representations of the
action, such as the nature ofthe actor's goals and intentions, on the other hand. The
observer must actively attend to the surface form of peoples' motions to grasp the "gist"
of what they are attempting to accomplish, even though some of those details are
eventually ignored or forgotten. Consider again an actor manipulating a bottle cap. A
slight change in the directionality of twisting-clockwise versus counterclockwise-
entirely reshapes the interpretation of ongoing action, changing it from opening to
closing. The observer must therefore attend to local perceptual features of the motion
display while simultaneously prioritizing the gist-level analysis over the perceptual
analysis when forming representations ofthe meaning ofthe observed actions.
An additional component of processing local perceptual features is predicting
future action, such as the probable trajectory of an action. As an actor moves through
space, highly relevant local details of the actions are often occluded, leaving the observer
without information about the nature of the intended act. If the executive cheftumed her
back to the observer just as she grasped the bottle cap, the observer would be unable to
see the critical act of opening the bottle. In such cases, the ability to predict future action
is the difference between understanding the event as opening the bottle and being puzzled
about why the chef would want to grasp and hold a bottle cap. Furthermore, the observer
must then be able to extract the gist ofthis event not by focusing on the observed motion
4stream, but instead focusing on the inferred act. The importance of action inference for
gist-level processing is also seen when using top-down information to analyze a sequence
of actions. The ability to see the common gist between the sous-chef s parboiling and
pan searing arises from domain knowledge about cooking that allows the observer to
recognize the these actions as preparatory, and thus to predict that other cooking methods
are likely to follow. Without this abstract representation ofthe gist of these two actions,
a critical similarity between them is lost.
While some research has investigated the formation of abstract action
representations in infancy, the bulk ofthis research has focused on infants' understanding
of the goal-directedness inherent in grasping an object (Phillips & Wellman, 2005;
Sommerville, Woodward, & Needham, 2005; Todd & Smith, 2008; Woodward, 1998; ,
1999; Woodward & Sommerville, 2000)" in looking at an object (Moore & Povinelli,
2007; Woodward, 2003), or in pointing at an object (Woodward & Guajardo, 2002). The
ability to recognize that grasps, points, and eye-gaze are directed at a particular goal
object and not simply at any object is a critical first step in social cognition. Nonetheless,
it is an early step on the pat~ to more mature action processing skills (Woodward,
Sommerville, & Guajardo, 2001). Making sense of the behavior of others involves more
than understanding that people direct grasps at goal objects-it involves interpreting what
people actually do with objects once they have grasped them. Returning again to the
kitchen scene described earlier, it is clear that any meaningful analyses of the action must
involve the ability to interpret how people manipulate objects like bottles, knives, and
balls of dough. It is possible that an infant is perfectly capable of understanding that the
5chef is directing her attention to that particular bottle without having the slightest
understanding of the meaning of the action that she subsequently performs on the bottle.
Very little is currently known about the development of mechanisms enabling
infants to simultaneously interpret the gist of object-directed action while glossing over
vast tracts of motion change between exemplars of those actions. The experiments
reported in this dissertation investigated whether infants display signs of early
sophistication at this human propensity to process action for gist, with specific attention
to infants' understanding of the gist of actions involving object manipulation.
As this question has not been the explicit topic of previous research, an
explanation of processing for gist is necessary before reviewing the existing literature on
infant social cognition. The theoretical foundation of this dissertation was informed by
what is known regarding gist-related processing in other domains, such as language. The
following sections contain a brief overview of some findings in the language processing
literature and a proposal regarding key components in processing action for gist. After
discussing the nature ofprocessing for gist, I will return to the literature on infant social
cognition, with particular attention to findings that are germane to the topics raised in this
dissertation.
Processing for Gist
When exposed to language, either written or spoken, there are at least two kinds
of information that can be retained: the surface form-e.g., the words used and the order
in which they were presented-and the meaning of the passage. An early and well-
6documented finding in the literature on text memory was that verbatim memory is not as
robust as memory for the meaning, or "idea," of a written passage (English, We1bom, &
Killian, 1934; Henderson, 1903; Welborn & English, 1937). The strength ofthis effect is
striking. Participants in one study (English et aI., 1934) read passages over 1,500 words
in length and had their memory for the material tested at intervals between four and
fourteen weeks. Participants were asked two types of true-false questions at test: the first
asked whether a given target sentence was a verbatim reproduction of a sentence in the
original text, and the second asked whether summary sentences captured ideas in the
original. While memory for the verbatim items dropped precipitously, participants'
memory for the ideas in the original text showed litt1e-to-no decline, even after fourteen
weeks.
Fillenbaum (1966) further investigated processing for the idea or content of a
sentence, which he called the gist, by testing whether participants' errors in recognition
would be more likely to preserve the meaning or surface form of a passage. Participants
listened to an audio recording of a list of sentences such as "the postman is not alive." In
test, they were given a written item~e.g., "the postman is (aj alive (bj not alive (cj dead
(dj not dead"~and asked to check the option that created the sentence they heard in the
familiarization phase. Fillenbaum examined whether participants' errors would be more
likely to change the meaning ofthe sentence but retain some of the surface form (e.g.,
option (aj alive in the above example), or if they would be more likely to make errors that
preserved the gist of the sentence but not the surface form (e.g., option (cj dead in the
above example). As predicted by a gist-processing hypothesis, when participants made
7errors in recognition they were more likely to preserve the gist of the sentence than
preserve some of the surface form. More recent research using a priming methodology
(McKoon & Ratcliff, 1980; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1978) found similar effects; namely, that
memory for a paragraph of written text is based on the propositions expressed rather than
the temporal order in which the sentences were presented within the paragraph. In short,
processing for gist entails homing in on the meaning of the input and disregarding surface
details that are not critical in representing the gist.
In adopting the term gist to describe action processing, first suggested by Baldwin
(2005), I propose that observers privilege an interpretation of the meaning of an action-
what that action wasfor and the result it produced in the world-rather than surface
details that do not influence the functional affordance of that action. This process
involves the three following components: I (A) The observer identifies the functional
affordance, or gist, of the action. In this nomenclature, functional affordance is defined
as that which the action enables the actor to do in the world, referring specifically to
actions that produce a clear result on some object or state of affairs in the world. (B)
When ab.le to extract the gist of the action, the observer tends to disregard surface motion
details unrelated to the gist, much like participants in language processing studies did not
encode gist-irrelevant details of a passage into long term memory. As a result, memory
for the event is based largely on the more abstract gist-level representation (Loucks, in
progress). However, observers maintain attention to the surface motion details in online
processing, thus when they are unable to identify the gist they rely more heavily on
bottom-up mechanisms an attempt to encode the action in some form (Cohen & Cashon,
I No claim is made here regarding the temporal or causal order of these components in on-line processing.
82006; Cohen, Chaput, & Cashon, 2002; see also Gleissner, Meltzoff, & Bekkering, 2000,
for a similar proposal regarding older children's action representation system). (C) The
observer categorizes action based on the gist, grouping together actions that may be
dissimilar in motion details but are similar in gist. This is the case for both observed and
inferred actions. The ability to form gist-based action categories is analogous to how
even young infants are capable of forming abstract categories of dog and cat, each of
which comprises multiple perceptually distinct exemplars (Quinn, Eimas, & Rosenkrantz,
1993; French, Mareschal, Mermillod, & Quinn, 2004).
The current proposal does not argue that observers are incapable of processing
surface detail, or even that they do so infrequently. Research detailing adults' ability to
capitalize on statistical regularities in a sequence of action (Baldwin et a1., 2007)
convincingly demonstrates that adults can attend to and remember surface details of
action, and preliminary data from our laboratory (Baldwin et a1., in preparation) suggests
that infants are capable of doing the same. Rather, the claim is that when observers can
readily interpret the gist of an action, in essence re-interpreting the event at a level more
abstract than the perceptual, they preferentially base their interpretation on the extracted
gist rather than surface details.
In freeing observers from the necessity of encoding all of the minutiae ofthe
surface features inherent in human action, gist-level processing promotes processing
efficiency while nevertheless enabling the viewer to reconstruct lower-level perceptual
features from memory if those details need to be recalled in the future (Gleissner et a1.,
2000). For instance, when encoding the chefs actions on the bottle as opening, one does
9not need to explicitly encode into memory the directionality of her movement; knowledge
of how bottle caps work, along with the gist-level representation, would allow the
observer to accurately infer that she moved her wrist in a counter-clockwise direction. In
situations where the gist is not obvious, such as is the case in Baldwin and colleagues'
research on observers' attention to statistical regularities in the motion stream (Baldwin et
aI., 2007; Baldwin et aI., in preparation), or in the case of observing a novel action,
observers still have access to processing strategies that favor surface-level motion details
(Cohen & Cashon, 2006). Gist-level processing, therefore, operates in tandem with
bottom-up mechanisms, except that when gist-level representations are available,
observers tend to prefer the gist-level representation when categorizing action and
possibly even when encoding it in memory (see also Baldwin, 2005; Loucks, in progress;
Karmiloff-Smith's [1992] representational redescription hypothesis; and Povinelli's
[2001] behavioral abstraction hypothesis, for related proposals).
The key goal of the research contained in this dissertation is to investigate infants'
interpretation of actions-and in particular those actions involving object-manipulation-
at a level more abstract than the perceptual. Gjven the large amount of continually
changing perceptual information inherent in ongoing, evanescent human action, it is
critical that infants are able to attend to the important features and disregard the
unimportant features ofthe motion display. The ability to categorize actions based on
gist is a watershed development that allows infants to make connections between distinct
action units and to construct hierarchical representations that are based on an actor's
goals and intentions. As noted above, previous research has found similar processes
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involved when encoding the meaning of spoken or written language. A benefit of
construing action analysis as "processing for gist" is that it encompasses several
interrelated components that are involved in navigating between perceptual and abstract
interpretations of human action (Cohen & Cashon, 2006; Cohen et aI., 2002). Rather
than simply highlighting the observer's skill in arriving at a single interpretation (e.g., the
goal of her action was to open the bottle), framing action analysis vis-it-vis gist-based
representations speaks to how observers move between several levels of analysis when
interpreting action, and thus has the potential to capture more of the complexity of the
action processing system.
Although the question of whether or not infants process multi-part action
sequences for gist has not previously been the direct focus of research, several lines of
research have provided relevant data on some of the constituent components described
above. The following section contains an exploration of the literature on infant social
cognition, as well as a discussion as to why these findings do not answer the questions
posed in this dissertation.
Social Cognition in Infancy
Glossing over Changes to Surface Motion Details
Seminal work by Woodward (1998), has investigated infants' ability to recognize
that manual grasps are directed at specific goal objects. The focus of this research and
subsequent studies on the topic (Guajardo & Woodward, 2004; Phillips & Wellman,
2005; Sommerville et aI., 2005; Woodward, 1999; Woodward & Sommerville, 2000) was
11
to ascertain whether infants gloss over at least some motion changes--e.g., to the path of
motion-and instead attend to deeper, more meaningful aspects of action, such as the
goal object toward which a grasp is directed.
In Woodward's (1998) research on infants' understanding of goal-directed grasps,
infants saw two small objects on either side of a stage at the start of habituation trials. An
arm then reached into the stage, grasped one of the two items, and held the position while
infants' looking time to the event was recorded. After habituating to repeated
presentations of this grasp, infants saw a trial in which the locations of the two toys had
been switched. The objects remained in the new, switched position for both types of test
trial. In new goal/old path test trials, the actor reached to the same spatial location to
which she had reached in the habituation phase, but now did so in order to grasp the toy
she had not previously grasped. In old goal/new path test trials, the actor reached out to
the side of the stage to which she did not reach in the habituation phase and grasped the
same toy that she grasped in the habituation phase. By 6 months of age, infants looked
reliably longer at new goal/old path trials than at old goal/new path trials. These findings
suggest that, indeed, infants glossed over changes to the path of the reach, privileged a
construal of the grasping action as being directed at a goal object, and were more
surprised when the actor switched goals than when she switched the location of her reach
(but see Biro & Leslie, 2007; and Kinily, Jovanovic, Prinz, Aschersleben, & Gergely,
2003, for alternative explanations of these results).
Infants' propensity to gloss over details in the path of a movement has also been
documented in research by Gergely and colleagues (Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro,
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1995). After being familiarized to a computer-generated shape move around a barrier in
order to reach a goal location, infants saw test trials in which the banier was no longer
present and the shape again went to the goal location. By 12-months-of-age, infants
looked longer when the shape took the same path as was taken in the familiarization
session than when the shape took a new, straight-line path to the goal locations.
According to Gergely and colleagues, this pattern suggests that infants expected the
shape to behave in a rational manner in test trials; the old convoluted path was irrational
given the absence of the barrier and therefore piqued infants' attention. As with research
by Woodward and colleagues on infants' understanding of manual grasps, this research
suggests that infants interpret motion events in a way that is deeper and more abstract
than a surface-level analysis of the motion parameters such as the path taken.
Although one might be concerned about the ecological validity of research using
animated shapes as agents instead of human actors, additional research on infants'
interpretation of action as rational has found corroborative evidence using a variety of
stimuli, such as a human actor approaching another person (Sodian, Schoeppner, & Metz,
2004) or a goal location (Kamewari, Kato, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hiraki, 2005), a humanoid
robot moving to a goal object (Kamewari et aI., 2005), an adult pressing a button, causing
it to illuminate (Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002), and an actor reaching for a goal
object (Phillips & Wellman, 2005). In each case, infants demonstrated an ability to make
an assumption about how an action is performed; namely, that self-propelled motion
toward a goal-state is rational if it follows a straight line from point A to point B,
deviating from that path only to avoid obstacles. These findings furthermore suggest that
13
when multiple construals of an action are possible--e.g., infants can focus on the path or
the rationality of the action-infants prefer to focus on the more abstract of the two
representations.
While infonnative, the research described above does not fully capture the gist-
processing skill of interest. For one thing, infants in these studies were tested on actions
that were actually quite similar, in surface motion tenns, to those viewed during
habituation. Although the location of the grasp changed, great care was taken to ensure
that the hand configuration used to grasp the objects, the speed at which the actor moved,
and other motion parameters were held constant between habituation and test trials.
Outside of the laboratory, however, people grasp objects at a range of speeds and with a
variety ofhand configurations. Thus the findings provide little sense of the power of
infants' gist-processing skill to gloss over the rampant degree ofperceptual variability
commonly encountered in human action.
Secondly, these studies are infonnative about only a limited fonn of action where
an adult reaches out and grasps an object or engages in self-propelled movement toward a
goal state. In everyday action, approaching and/or grasping an object is usually a means
to accomplish a different end. Although it is clearly necessary for infants to understand
grasps as directed at goal objects and to understand that such actions are typically
performed in a rational manner, the utility of this understanding arguably lies in its role in
enabling infants to interpret the entire action sequence, of which approaching and
grasping the object are just two components. It is possible, for instance, to see a person
engaging in an action that one does not understand but to nonetheless understand that
14
they are perfonning that action in a rational, goal-directed manner. When a baseball
pitcher reaches down to the dirt behind the mound in order to briefly grasp a small white
bag, it is clear that by reaching in a straight line to grasp the bag the pitcher is performing
the grasping action rationally (Phillips & Wellman, 2005). Nonetheless, the observer
may have little understanding ofthe action in a deeper sense, such as
the pitcher's use of the powdered rosin contained in the bag to make his or her
hands drier and stickier, enabling a better grip on the ball.
Finally, it is not clear from any of the aforementioned studies whether infants'
processing is generative, in tenns of driving their expectations for actors' subsequent
action. One especially valuable aspect of gist-level processing lies in its power to
generate inferences regarding future action. I now tum to the evidence on infants' ability
to predict future action based on previously viewed action.
Generating Inferences Regarding Future Action
To some extent, the entire literature on the ontogenesis of social cognition speaks
to infants' ability to generate inferences regarding future action. In infant looking-time
studies, infants' visual preference for test actions is driven by expectations of what an
agent is likely to do, and increased looking reflects surprise at a disconnect between the
observed and expected behaviors. The bulk of this research has focused on infants'
understanding of self-propelled motion to a goal location (Csibra, 2008; Gergelyet aI.,
1995) and grasps (Todd & Smith, 2008; Woodward, 1998). It is not clear from much of
this work, however, whether infants are able to generate an inference about what an actor
is likely to do with an object once they have contacted it. In Gergely and colleagues'
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research, for example, we are left not knowing what infants predict for future action upon
viewing an actor engage in a rational versus irrational action. Although infants in one
study (Csibra, Biro, Koos, & Gergely, 2003) demonstrated an ability to infer an unseen
goal-completion event-infants were habituated to one digitized circle approaching
another circle as they exited the computer screen and infants inferred the eventual contact
event-it is still unclear if infants would be capable of inferring what would be likely to
happen post-contact.
Suggestive evidence of a generative system comes from research by Phillips,
Wellman, and Spelke (2002). In the habituation phase, 12- and 14-month-old infants saw
an adult emoting positively to one of two stuffed animals. Infants were tested on two
types of test trials, each of which comprised two components. The initial component of
both test trial types depicted an adult displaying positive affect toward one ofthe stuffed
animals. A curtain was then drawn, occluding the actor, and when it was removed the
actor was shown holding a stuffed animal. In the first test trial type, the actor emoted
positively toward and retrieved the stuffed animal that was not regarded in habituation
trials. In the second test trial type, the actor emoted positively toward the same stuffed
animal as in the habituation phase, but was subsequently shown holding the new stuffed
animal, toward which she had not displayed any regard. Fourteen-month-old infants-
but not 12-month-olds-looked longer at this latter type of test trial, suggesting that they
are capable of inferring that if a person emotes positively toward an object, he or she will
likely act to obtain it. These findings point to a generative system in that, after seeing
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one behavior (i.e., the positive emoting), infants infer that the actor will engage in
another, previously unseen behavior (i.e., retrieving).
Recent research by Kuhlmeier, Wynn, and Bloom (2003) also speaks to the
question of whether infants' skill at inferring future actions is truly generative. The focus
of this research was whether infants could engage in social evaluation of a pair of
interacting agents; specifically, whether infants recognize the difference between helping
and hindering. More germane to the current issue, Kuhlmeier and colleagues investigated
whether infants use those classifications to guide their inferences regarding those agents'
behavior in novel contexts. During the habituation phase, infants saw a computer-
generated circle attempt to climb a hill. After appearing to falter, infants saw, in
alternating order, trials in which another animated shape (e.g., a square) came down to
help the circle by pushing it up the hill, and trials in which a third animated-shape (e.g., a
triangle) hindered the circle by pushing it back down the hill. In test, infants saw a screen
with only the three shapes. On alternating trials, the circle approached either the hinderer
or the helper. Drawing on previous research suggesting that infants attribute either
positive or negative valence to agentive action (Premack & Premack, 1997), Kuhlmeier
and colleagues hypothesized that 12-month-old infants would evaluate the likeability of
the helper and hinderer shapes and thus expect that if the circle were given the choice to
approach either of the two other shapes, it would prefer to approach the helper.
Consistent with this hypothesis, infants looked longer when the circle approached the
helper, suggesting that infants were able to make a judgment about the likeability of each
shape and generated an inference as to which of the shapes the circle was more likely to
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approach.2 Follow-up research by Hamlin, Wynn, and Bloom (2007) found similar
results with a sample of 10-month-olds.
The research on social evaluation comes closer than previous research to
addressing the question of infants' processing for gist. Infants' looking in both the
research by Phillips et al. and Kuhlmeier et al. was to events in a very different context
than seen in habituation, demonstrating that infants can use their evaluation of previous
actions to generate predictions of how agents are likely to behave in new contexts.
These results make it plausible that infants can make generative inferences regarding
future actions, although the two studies did not reach the same conclusion about whether
this ability is present in 12-month-old infants.
Once again, however, these studies do not completely capture the gist-processing
skill of interest. First, shapes-even agentive ones-are not capable of the wide range of
actions of which humans are capable. Even casting aside potentially critical questions of
ecological validity in research that uses computer-generated shapes as agents, an observer
of the actions of shapes will never have to gloss over the wide range of surface motion
information in order to extract the gist that he or she would have to gloss over in order to
extract the gist of human action. Infants might be capable of glossing over perceptual
variability between the actions of shapes between different contexts but fail when they try
to interpret even the simplest human action.
2 Kuhlmeier and colleagues argue that these trials present a "more coherent continuation of the habituation
movies" (p. 407), causing the infants to look longer at those trials, therefore supporting the hypothesis.
Regardless of questions concerning the most appropriate interpretation of infants' social evaluative skills
from this pattern, they demonstrate that infants had an expectation of how the circle would behave on test
trials.
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Second, the question of infants' understanding of object manipulation was not a
focus of this research. While research by Phillips and colleagues demonstrates that 14-
month~olds are capable of generative inferences regarding future action, these
experiments, like Woodward's, cannot assess infants' predictions of what an actor is
likely to do with an object once it is grasped. Retuming again to the kitchen example
used in the beginning of the introduction, the inferential skills tapped by the research by
Phillips et al. and Kuhlmeier et al. are not necessarily the same skills as those that would
be required to infer what the executive chef was about to do with the bottle when she
tumed her back to the observer. The research by Phillips et al. and Kuhlmeier et al.
instead point to infants' ability to infer one action unit from another action unit, not to
infer the completion of an interrupted action unit involving object manipulation. The
question therefore remains: are infants capable of going beyond the obvious surface-level
features to extract the gist of everyday human action involving objects?
Understanding Object Manipulation
Two additional lines of research provide some limited evidence of infants'
understanding of object manipulation. Song, Baillargeon, and Fisher (2005) investigated
whether 13.S-month-old infants attribute behavioral dispositions to actors. In the
familiarization phase of the experiment, infants saw three successive trials in which the
actor grasped a toy (a different toy was used in each trial) and slid it back-and-forth
between herself and the infant. Over the course of these trials, the authors argued that
infants attributed a behavioral disposition to the actor-e.g., this person slides objects.
At test, the actor sat in front of two toy trucks, one in a long box that would enable the
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actor to slide the truck as in familiarization trials, and the other in a short box that left no
room for the truck to slide. Infants looked longer when the actor grasped (but did not
move) the truck in the short box, indicating surprise that a person who slides objects
would grasp a truck that cannot slide. This finding suggests that by 13.5-months, infants
recognize the relationship between grasping and manipulating objects, and they believe
that people are likely to possess a disposition to manipulate an object in a given manner.
Additional support for the hypothesis that 12-month-old infants understand
something of object manipulation comes from an experiment by Woodward and
Sommerville (2000). In this study, infants were habituated to an actor opening the lid of
a transparent container and grasping the toy inside. Before the test phase, the boxes
remained in their locations but the toys inside the two boxes were switched. On
alternating test trials, the actor grasped-but did not open-the lids of the two boxes.
Infants looked longer at trials where the actor grasped the lid of the same box containing
a new toy than on trials where the actor grasped the lid of a new box containing the same
toy. This finding convincingly demonstrates that infants interpreted the point of the lid-
grasp as directed at the toy inside rather than at the box itself. Furthermore, these
findings suggest that infants understand something about object manipulation (e.g., lids
are opened to enable access to the contents of the container) and demonstrate that infants
are capable of generating inferences of future action based on limited information (e.g.,
when the actor grasps the lid, she will open it in order to grasp the toy inside).
As with the research on infants' ability to generate inferences of future actions,
the experiments by Song et al. and Woodward and Sommerville both investigated skills
-----------_.--------------------
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related to processing for gist. Infants in both lines of research were able to generate
inferences about future action and used these inferences to drive their looking in test
trials. Importantly, both sets of results provide evidence that infants understand
something about the purpose of actions involving object manipulation.
Several questions remain, however. It is not clear that infants in Song et al.'s
experiment interpreted a disposition on the part of the actor. Increased looking to the
short box events could have been driven by attention to the object's affordances;
according to this explanation, the results could indicate that infants were surprised that,
after seeing sliding events, the non-slideable object was grasped, leading infants to infer
that they would not see sliding on that trial. The looking patterns in test, therefore, could
have had little to do with an understanding of human action.
In addition to questions regarding whether these data shed light on infants'
understanding of human action rather than object affordances, it is the case that the
motion parameters varied very little between trials in both of these studies. The actor in
both Song et al.'s research and in the research by Woodward and Sommerville used the
same hand configuration in each habituation and test trial; therefore, it is not possible to
assess if infants were processing gist at the expense of surface detail, which infants would
do if they prioritized a gist-related construal (Cohen & Cashon, 2006; Fillenbaum, 1966;
Welborn & English, 1937). Furthermore, in Woodward and Sommerville's research, the
final goal ofthe action sequences was to grasp an object, leaving unanswered the
questions posed in this dissertation regarding infants' understanding of what people do
with goal objects after they have grasped them.
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Summarizing Research Germane to Processingfor Gist
The literature reviewed above has provided important information regarding (1)
infants' ability to gloss over perceptual details of the path of grasps (Phillips & Wellman,
2005; Woodward, 1998) and self-propelled motion toward an endstate (Csibra et aI.,
2003; Gergely et aI., 1995; Kamawari et aI., 2005) in order to ascertain the goal of the
action; (2) infants' ability to generate expectations regarding how agentive shapes will
behave toward others in novel contexts (Hamlin et aI., 2007; Kuhlmeier et aI., 2003;
Phillips et aI., 2002); and (3) infants' ability to make sense of object manipulation
(Sommerville & Woodward, 2005a; Song et aI., 2005; Woodward & Sommerville, 2000).
Together, each of these studies provide suggestive evidence that infants are capable of at
least some of the components involved in processing action for gist.
Although no research to date has investigated processing for gist in infants 12-
months or younger, classic work by Meltzoff (1995) provides relevant data for older
infants on two of the gist-processing components. In that experiment, 18-month-old
infants saw a failed attempt to achieve a goal-e.g., an actor trying to pull apart a
dumbbell but having his hands slip off the ends, leaving the two halves intact. When
allowed to manipulate the objects themselves, infants imitated the target action-i.e.,
pulling the dumbbell apart-at greater-than-chance levels, despite never having seen the
object manipulated successfully. These findings are highly relevant to the question of
interest in that they speak to infants' ability to generate inferences regarding future action
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and also infants' understanding of object manipulation. Nonetheless, two issues remain:
(1) it is not clear from this work that infants, when observing the actions of others,
recognize that the surface motion details can vary widely, but do so in a manner that does
not alter the gist; and (2) the use of imitation methodologies, which require a high degree
of task compliance and motor skills, may underestimate younger infants' understanding.
Despite these impressive advances in the field of infant social cognition, it is still
not clear if infants gloss over substantial variation to the surface details of a motion
stream to extract the gist of the action, or if they categorize actions based on the inferred
gist rather than on the observed surface details. The experiments described below
attempted to provide data bearing on each of these issues.
Rationale for the Current Experiments
This dissertation examined whether infants 12-months-of-age and younger
process action for gist. In the context of social cognition, processing for gist is defined as
interpreting human actions involving object manipulation in a manner that (A) focuses on
the functional affordance of the observed action-i.e., what that action allows the actor to
do in the world; (B) glosses over surface details inherent in the motion stream that are
unrelated to the functional affordance of the action; and (C) prioritizes the gist-level
representation such that perceptually dissimilar actions may be seen as exemplars of the
same action category, even when such gist-level representations are based on inferred
actions.
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The current experiments focused on 5- to 7-month-old and 10- to 12-month-old
infants. Several lines of research point to a "revolution" in social cognitive processing in
the period between 9-12 months (Tomasello, 1999). According to this account, infants
see other people as "like me" (MeItzoff & Gopnik, 1993; MeItzoff, 2007), using their
understanding oftheir own action to interpret the actions of other people. As Piaget
(1952) noted, at around 8 months infants begin to understand that a single goal can be
achieved via a variety ofbehavioral means. Tomasello argues that 9-month-old infants
use their newfound understanding of their own behavioral capabilities to revamp their
interpretation of others' actions (see also Sommerville & Woodward, 2005b;
Sommerville et aI., 2005). The two age groups in the current experiments were selected
in order to include infants on either side of this important developmental period. I
predicted that older infants would be capable of gist-level processing, whereas younger
infants would focus on surface-level details when processing action. Specifically, I
predicted that younger infants would show increased attention to all test actions that
depicted a perceptually dissimilar action as seen in habituation, whereas older infants
would selectiv.ely show increased attention only to test events that were inconsistent in
gist with the habituation action, regardless of surface-level motion details.
The predictions outlined above are concordant with the observations of Piaget
(1952) in that infants younger than 8 months do not yet use a variety ofmeans to achieve
a single goal; absent such awareness of their own causal efficacy, they would be limited
in their ability to recognize that an actor can engage in several perceptually dissimilar
acts that are similar at a more abstract level, such as the goal (Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1993;
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Tomasello, 1999). On this account, the development of gist-level processing could be
thus driven, in part, by changes in infants' self-action awareness; ifinfants are to
categorize actions in a way that glosses over surface-level detail, they must recognize that
they can achieve their own goals via actions that vary in one or more motion parameters.
Of course, developments in social cognition could also be influenced by gradual changes
in domain-general information processing efficiency (Cohen & Cashon, 2006; Halford,
1993) or the maturation of domain-specific action processing skills (Gergely & Csibra,
2003). Even under these alternative accounts, however, one may predict that infants
older than 9-months would perform differently than younger infants. Given the gist-
processing skill of interest, 5- to 7-months is an appropriate age to compare to older
infants because (a) the CUlTent experiments tested infants' understanding of action
sequences involving pushing or pulling an object, and infants ofthis age are thought to
lack relevant means-ends understanding of such actions (Piaget, 1952; Sommerville,
Hildebrand, & Crane, in press; Sommerville & Woodward, 2005a), while at the same
time (b) 5- to 7-month-old infants have been shown to possess basic understanding of the
goal-directed nature of grasping actions (Woodward, 1998; 1999). Therefore, a failure to
display evidence of gist extraction would not be due to a complete lack of ability to
process human action of this kind, but instead would be more likely to reflect differences
in gist-level processing per se.
Experiment 1 investigated infants' understanding ofthe gist oftwo post-grasping
actions-pushing and pulling-when instances of those actions differed considerably on
the surface. Push and pull were selected as actions within which to explore the question
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because pioneering research by Cohen and colleagues (Casasola & Cohen, 2000; Cohen,
Bradley, & Casasola, 1995) suggests that, at least by 14-months-of-age, infants can
discriminate pushing and pulling events performed by non-human agents. Due to the
importance of object manipulation in infants' own action experience (Rochat, 2001;
Rochat & Striano, 1998; Sommerville & Woodward, 2005b), it was hypothesized that by
10- to 12-months-of-age, infants would be able to interpret pushing and pulling events
performed by human actors.
Experiments 2a and 2b attempted to replicate the effects from the 10- to 12-
month-old and 5- to 7-month-old infants, respectively, found in Experiment 1. Slight
modifications to the methodology used in Experiment 1 were introduced in Experiments
2a and 2b, with the purpose of increasing infants' attention throughout the procedure.
Experiment 3 investigated gist-level processing of a different action distinction:
opening and closing. To the extent that gist-level processing is a powerful and robust
skill at 10-12 months, infants should display this skill with a variety of action categories.
Opening and closing actions were selected for Experiment 4 because data from research
by Woodward and Sommerville (2000) suggest 12-month-old infants understand the
functional act of opening a container to get a toy. Experiment 4 built on and extended
these results by investigating infants' understanding of closing, in addition to whether
they could gloss over substantial variability in the motion parameters and extract the gist
of these actions.
Experiment 4 was motivated by two questions. The first question was whether
infants can categorize actions on the basis of a shared gist even when several motion
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parameters vary between two action exemplars. In Experiments 1 through 3, habituation
and test actions differed primarily in the hand configuration used to contact the object and
in the absence of object motion in the test actions. In Experiment 4, habituation and test
actions additionally varied in several other motion parameters, such as the number of
hands used to contact the object and whether the actors engaged in direct eye contact.
The second question was whether, given two potential gist-related construals of an action,
infants would prefer to categorize perceptually dissimilar action exemplars on the basis of
the more abstract of the two gist levels.
Additionally, Experiment 4 provided data relevant to an interpretational question
regarding the nature of the gist infants may have extracted in the first three experiments.
Infants in Experiments 1, 2a, and 2b could have interpreted the actions shown in the
habituation phase as either pushing and pulling, or as giving or taking. The methodology
used in those studies does not allow these two possible interpretations to be
differentiated. A new methodology was developed for Experiment 4 that was based on
the "new path vs. new goal" manipulation used by Woodward (1998; 1999). This
methodology allowed a preliminary investigation as to whether infants encode the dyadic
nature of object transfer events in their gist-level representations ofthe action.
In each ofthe experiments described above, infants were shown an event
depicting an actor manipulating some object during the habituation phase. At test, they
were shown two actions that were perceptually dissimilar in several motion parameters
and ended before the critical object manipulation event. Therefore, infants needed to
infer the actor's likely subsequent action, extract the gist ofthe test event based on the
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inferred action, and gloss over the surface-level dissimilarities between the actions seen
in habituation and test in order to construe them as similar in gist.
----------------------
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CHAPTER II
EXPERIMENT I
Overview
Experiment I investigated 5- to 7-month-old and IO- to 12-month-old infants'
understanding of the gist ofpushing and pulling actions using test stimuli that were novel
relative to the actions infants viewed during habituation. In question was whether infants
are capable of glossing over changes to the motion parameters involved in the
manipulation of objects in order to focus on the functional affordance, or gist, of the
action.
Infants were habituated to one of two actions. In one action, a woman reached
out, grasped a glass on a table, and pushed it to another woman sitting on the opposite
side of a table. In the other action, the woman pulled the glass to herself after grasping it.
At test, all infants saw two actio~s. In the inferred-push test video, the woman reached
out and made contact with the rim of the glass as if to propel the glass forward-i.e.,
where the gist is to push-but did not actually move the glass. In the inferred-pull test
video, she made contact with the rim as if to propel the glass back toward herself-i.e.,
where the gist is to pull-but, again, did not move the glass. The actor's hand
configuration in each test video was noticeably distinct from the ambiguous hand
configuration in habituation.
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Prior research by Cohen and colleagues (Casasola & Cohen, 2000; Cohen et aI.,
1995) documented that by 14 months, infants understand the causal relations in animated
pushing and pulling events involving self-propelled inanimate objects such as cars and
trucks. The current experiment tested younger infants because of the possibility that
pushing and pulling events performed by a human actor may be understood earlier than
similar events enacted by objects due to infants' own experience with manipulating
objects (Rochat & Striano, 1998; Sommerville & Woodward, 2005b; Sommerville et aI.,
2005). Furthermore, verbs for moving objects (e.g., push) appear early in children's
productive vocabularies (Tomasello, 1992), suggesting that pushing and pulling events
are of considerable interest to infants.
If infants are able to categorize actions based on gist, then those who were
habituated to the pulling event should, at test, show greater interest in the inferred-push
actions than the inferred-pUll actions. Conversely, infants habituated to the pushing event
should show greater interest in the inferred-pull actions than the inferred-push actions.
This pattern would convincingly attest to gist-related processing because the test videos
were carefully designed such that surface motion differences were equivalent between the
two types of test videos relative to the habituation videos. Thus, infants' interest in the
gist-inconsistent test videos could not be due to surface differences, but would instead
reflect their sensitivity to the inferred functional commonality between the action viewed
during habituation and the inferred function of the action depicted in the test videos.
I hypothesized that 10- to 12-month-olds-who have displayed an understanding
of a handful of complex action sequences in previous research (e.g., Sommerville &
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Woodward, 2005b; Woodward & Sommerville, 2000)-would demonstrate gist-level
processing by looking longer at gist-inconsistent test trials than at gist-consistent test
trials. In contrast, I predicted that 5- to 7-month-olds--who, in their own action, do not
generally use a variety of behavioral means to achieve a goal (Piaget, 1952)-would be
limited in their ability to categorize perceptually dissimilar actions by a shared gist
(Tomasello, 1999) and thus would not process the actions for gist. Rather, I expected that
5- to 7-month-olds would show elevated attention to both test trial types due to their
perceptual novelty.
Method
Participants
Sixteen 5- to 7-month-olds (M = 6 months, 23 days; range: 5 months 4 days to 7
months 22 days; 8 girls, 8 boys) and sixteen 10- to 12-month-olds (M = 11 months, 5
days; range: 10 months 0 days, 12 months 15 days; 8 girls, 8 boys) participated in the
study. Twelve additional infants participated, but were excluded from analyses due to
parental over-involvement (n = 2), coder error (n = 2), data with extreme outliers, defined
as looking times more than two standard deviations from the mean (n = 2)3 or fussiness
and inattention, defined as infants for whom more than three trials had to be re-run due to
insufficient looking time-i.e., less than two seconds of looking per trial (n = 6).
3 One infant had two such outliers, one on each test trial type. The second infant had one such outlier in the
direction predicted by the hypothesis. The omissions, therefore, did not favor the hypothesis.
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Materials
Infants were habituated to one of two digitized action sequences (see Figure 1).
Each action sequence began with two women seated across from each other at a table
covered with black cloth, looking at each other and smiling. On the table between them
was a translucent glass containing blightly colored breakfast cereal. In the first
component ofthe action sequence, lasting 1.93 seconds, one of the women reached out
and grasped the glass. The grasp video was specifically created to be ambiguous, in that
it could be followed by either a pushing action or a pulling action, and predicted neither
action. This grasp video was then spliced to, and merged with, the additional motion
sequences depicting push versus pull to create two habituation videos. The same video
clip of the gist-ambiguous grasp was used in each video to minimize the possibility that
subtle clues in the actor's body language would telegraph the direction of the eventual
motion of the glass.
The habituation stimulus presented to infants in the observed-push condition
began with the grasp video just described, followed by the actor moving the glass toward
the other wo~an. In contrast, infants who were habituated in the observed-pull condition
saw the grasp action followed by the actor pulling the glass toward herself. The push and
pull motions were identical in length (2.37 seconds) and were followed by a three-second
still-frame presentation of the last frame ofthe video. To create a smooth transition from
the grasp action to the actor's movement of the glass, merging was performed with
iMovie software (Apple, 2005) using a 12-frame overlap transition.
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Observed-Push
Condition
1. Start 2. Ambiguous Grasp
Observed-Pull
Condition
3.PuU
Figure 1: Illustrative still frame images from the videos used in the habituation phase of
Experiment 1.
Test videos were of two types: In the inferred-push test video, the same actor who
manipulated the glass during habituation reached out and contacted the near side ofthe
rim of the glass with her angled palm without moving the glass (see Figure 2). Her hand
configuration would enable her to push, but not pull, the glass. In the inferred-pull test
video, the actor reached out and contacted the opposite side of the glass with her angled
palm, which would enable her to pull, but not push, the glass. Again, in neither test video
did the actor actually move the glass. The duration of the motion in each test video, 1.93
seconds, equaled the duration of the ambiguous grasp in habituation. Both test trial
videos concluded with a one-second still-frame of the actor's hand on the glass.
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Procedure
Infants sat on a parent's lap approximately 70 cm away from the 24 x 33 em video
screen. During habituation trials, infants' looking time was recorded throughout the
entire action sequence. Both observed~push and observed-pull habituation videos
included up to five loops of the action sequence (total duration 40.54 seconds): that is, the
sequence of a grasp followed by either a push or a pull was followed by a one-second
blank screen, at which point the identical action sequence was displayed again. A trial
continued until infants either looked away from the screen for at least two consecutive
seconds or all five loops of the video were presented, whichever came first. If infants
failed to look at the screen for at least two seconds, the trial was repeated. The
habituation phase ended when either the average looking to the three last trials was less
than 50% of the average looking time to the first three trials, or when ten trials had been
completed. Infants' looking time was coded online by an observer using custom software
(Pinto, 2003) that automatically calculated habituation criteria and advanced to test trials
when appropriate.
Although infants participated in just one habituation condition (either push or
pull), all infants saw both types of test actions presented in alternating order. Infants saw
three test trial pairs, with each pair containing one of each type of test action. As in
habituation, after the action sequence was complete, a blank screen appeared for one
second, followed by up to seven additional looping presentations of the action sequence
(total duration 31.48 seconds) within a given test trial. A test trial continued until the
infant looked away for two consecutive seconds after accumulating at least two seconds
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of looking time on that trial. The order of presentation of the two test trials was
counterbalanced such that half of the infants in each habituation condition had a inferred-
push test trial first, and the other half had an inferred-pull test trial first.
Inferred-Push Test Trials
1. Start 2. Push-contact
Inferred-Pull Test Trials
1. Start 2. Pull-contact
Figure 2: lllustrative still frame images from the videos used in the test phase of
Experiment 1.
Results
In this and all experiments reported in this dissertation, looking times were
subjected to a log transformation to reduce positive skewness, which is typical oflooking
time data. For ease of interpretation, all descriptive statistics reported throughout this
dissertation are untransformed values.
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Habituation Phase Analyses
Infants in the 10- to 12-month age group viewed, on average, 7.6 habituation trials
(SD = 2.0) and accumulated a total of 68.24 seconds (SD = 21.85) of looking over the
course of the habituation phase. There were no differences between infants in the two
habituation conditions with respect to average looking times during the first three
habituation trials, average looking time to the last three habituation trials, the total
amount of looking time during the entire habituation phase, or in the number of trials
viewed during the habituation phase (all Fs < 1.8, all ps > .20). A Fisher's exact test
examined whether infants in the two habituation conditions differed in the frequency with
which they met the habituation criterion before moving to test trials; this analysis
revealed no differences between infants in the observed-pull condition (4 met criterion, 4
did not) and infants in the observed-push condition (6 met criterion, 2 did not),p = .61.
Infants in the 5- to 7-month age group viewed, on average, 8.7 habituation trials
(SD = 1.8) and accumulated a total of 49.18 seconds (SD = 19.96) of looking over the
course of the habituation phase. There were no differences between infants in the two
habituation conditions with respect to average looking times during the first three
habituation trials, average looking time to the last three habituation trials, the total
amount oflooking time during the entire habituation phase, or in the number oftrials
viewed during the habituation phase (all Fs < 1.3, ns). Fisher's exact test was used to
examine whether infants in the two habituation conditions differed in the frequency with
which they met the habituation criterion before moving to test trials; this analysis
36
revealed no differences between infants in the observed-pull condition (5 met criterion, 3
did not) and infants in the observed··push condition (l met criterion, 7 did not), p = .12.
Test Phase Analyses
The central question was whether infants, regardless of habituation condition,
looked longer at gist-inconsistent than gist-consistent test trials. Repeated measures
ANOVAs with habituation condition (observed-push versus observed-pull) as the
between-subjects factor and test gist-type (gist-consistent versus gist-inconsistent) and
test trial pair (first and second) as within-subjects factors were performed separately on
the two age groups. Only the first two trial pairs were included in the analysis because of
general disinterest during, and missing data on, the third trial pair. It was predicted that,
within the older sample only, infants would look significantly longer at gist-inconsistent
than gist-consistent test trials, resulting in a significant main effect of test gist-type.
Ten- to 12-Month-Olds. Preliminary ANOVAs on infants' looking times toward
test stimuli revealed that sex, order of presentation of test stimuli, and infants' tendency
to meet the habituation criterion yielded neither significant main effects on test
performance nor interacted with other factors; therefore, subsequent analyses collapsed
across these factors.
A repeated measures ANOVA with habituation condition (observed-push versus
observed-pull) as the between-subjects factor and test gist-type (gist-consistent versus
gist-inconsistent) and test trial pair4 (first and second) as within-subjects factors was
4 Although the test trial pair factor was not part of the a priori model, preliminary analyses found that it had
a significant effect on the results; therefore, it was included in the final model.
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performed on the data. The predicted main effect of gist type was not significant, F'(1,
14) = 1.90,p = .19.
There was an unexpected interaction, however, between test gist-type and test
trial pair, F'(l, 14) = 8.35,p < .05. A follow-up 2 (habituation condition) x 2 (test gist-
type) repeated measures ANOVA tested for the predicted effect on the first trial pair
only. Here, the predicted main effect of test gist-type was significant, F'(l, 14) = 5.78,p
< .05, d' = .755 (see Figure 3), demonstrating that infants preferred to look at the first
presentation of test events depicting an action inconsistent in gist (M = 11.30, SD = 8.24)
with the action seen during habituation relative to test actions consistent in gist with the
action seen in habituation (M = 5.88, SD = 3.32).6 Non-parametric analyses confirmed
that infants looked longer at the first presentation of gist-inconsistent test trials than the
first presentation of gist-consistent test trials, Wilcoxon signed-ranks Z = 2.02, P < .05.
Planned directional simple effects analyses tested for the predicted effect within
each habituation condition. Infants in the observed-push condition showed marginally
significant longer looking to gist-inconsistent test trials (inferred-pull average M = 11.63,
SD = 8.21) than to gist-consistent test trials (inferred-push average M = 5.94, SD = 2.85),
F'(l, 14) = 2.52,p < .07, d'= .60 (see Figure 4). Infants in the observed-pull condition
looked significantly longer to gist-inconsistent test trials (inferred-push average M =
5 As Cohen's d overestimates (j when sample sizes are small, d'-which adjusts d to correct this bias
(Hedges & aIkin, 1985; Hunter & Schmidt, 1990)-is reported throughout this dissertation.
6 One might be concerned that the predicted pattern of findings was obtained only for the first pair of test
trials. Fortunately, the design precautions we undertook meant that data from the first test trial were
carefully controlled for order of presentation, ruling out the possibility that infants simply looked longest to
the first test trial regardless of gist type. Moreover, it is not unusual in habituation studies for the prediction
to be confirmed only on the first test trial (e.g., Biro & Leslie, 2007; Gergely et a!., 1995; Saxe, Tzelnic, &
Carey, 2007), in part because test trials attenuate the very effects under investigation (Hunter & Ames,
1988).
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10.97, 3D = 8.82) than to gist-consistent test trials (inferred-pull average M = 5.82, /)1) =
3.93), F(l, 14) = 3.27,p < .05, d' = .73. The simple effects analyses are striking given
that a) only eight infants participated in each habituation condition, and b) the pattern of
looking times during test trials was similar between the two conditions despite the fact
that different actions were gist-consistent or gist-inconsistent between the conditions.
- • - Gist-inconsistent
......-. Gist-consistent
20
18
~ 16 -<.:>Q)
en
'-' 14Q)
S 12............
OIl
~ 10......~
0
.Q 8
~
~
Q) 6;;8
4-
2 -
0'
1 2 3
,
Last 3 Mean
•
Test
Habituation trial
Figure 3: Ten- to 12-month old infants' mean looking times (in seconds), collapsed
across habituation condition, to the first three habituation trials, the mean of the last
three habituation trials, and the first presentation of each test trial type in Experiment 1.
Five- to 7-Month-Olds. Preliminary analyses found no effects of sex, infants'
tendency to meet the habituation criterion, or the order of presentation of test stimuli;
these factors were removed from the analysis. In contrast to the older sample, there were
no effects of test trial pair, so responses were collapsed across the first two trial pairs.
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Figure 4: Ten- to 12-month-olds infants' mean looking times (in seconds), by
habituation condition, to the mean of the last three habituation trials and the first
presentation of each test video in Experiment 1.
As predicted, the main effect of test gist-type was not significant with the younger
age group; 5- to 7-month-old infants did not look reliably longer at either gist-
inconsistent (M = 6.58, SD = 4.28) or gist-consistent test trials (M = 5.14, SD = 3.56),
F(l, 14) = 2.06, P = .17, d' = .35 (see Figure 5).
However, there appeared to be an unexpected effect of condition (see Figure 6).
When planned directional simple effects analyses were used to test infants' looking times
to the two test gist-types, a trend emerged such that infants in the two conditions
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perfonned differently. Infants in the observed-push condition looked significantly longer
at gist-inconsistent test actions (inferred-pull M = 6.71, SD = 4.06) than at gist-consistent
test actions (inferred-pushM= 3.83, SD = 1.73), F(l, 14) = 3.40,p < .05, d'= .81. This
difference was also significant using a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, Z = 1.96, p = .05. The
same comparison did not approach significance for infants in the observed-pull condition
(F < 0.1, ns). These findings suggest that infants as young as 5- to 7-months-old have a
nascent understanding of the gist of pushing actions.? Possible interpretations and
implications of these findings are discussed below.
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Figure 5: Five- to 7-month old infants' mean looking times (in seconds), collapsed
across habituation condition, to the first three habituation trials, the mean of the last
three habituation trials, and each test trial type in Experiment 1.
7 Due to findings that infants' understanding of the goal-directed nature of grasping actions strengthens in
the period between 5-6 months (Woodward, 1998), infants' performance within the younger group were
inspected to see if there were changes in performance between 5-7 months. These analyses revealed no
significant differences. Similar analyses performed on each sample throughout the dissertation likewise
yielded no significant age-related differences within a single age range.
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Looking Time Recovery Analyses
Another route to examining the central question within this data set involved
testing whether infants' looking time to each test trial type was elevated relative to the
average ofthe last three habituation trials. If infants processed action for gist at the
expense of superficial motion parameters, they should recover looking time to test actions
inconsistent in gist with the habituation action, but should not recover looking time to test
actions consistent in gist. This pattern would be noteworthy in that the action depicted in
each test trial type was equally dissimilar to habituation events.
As predicted, 10- to 12-month olds' looking time to the first gist-inconsistent test
trial (M = 11.30, SD = 8.24) was significantly longer than their average looking time to
the last three habituation trials (M = 6.31, SD = 2.88), directional paired-samples t(15) =
2.82, P < .05, d' = .85. In contrast, there was a nonsignificant trend toward decreased
looking time to the first gist-consistent test trial (M= 5.88, SD = 3.32), t < 1, ns.
Similar tests were performed on the data from 5- to 7-month-olds, with the
exception that the average looking across both trial pairs was used as there was no
significant effect of trial pair in the looking time ofth.ese infants. Overall, younger
infants showed significant recovery of looking time from the average of the last three
habituation trials (M = 4.98, SD = 3.13) to gist-inconsistent test trials (M = 6.58, SD =
4.28), directional paired-samples t( 15) = 1.77, P < .05, d' = .49. Looking time to gist-
consistent test trials (M= 5.14, SD = 3.56) was not significantly different from the last
three habituation trials, t < 1, ns. Despite the condition differences found with the simple
effects analyses reported above, when Looking Time Recovery Analyses were performed
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separately within each habituation condition no significant patterns emerged (ts < 1.7, ps
> .15).
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Figure 6: Five- to 7-month-olds infants' mean looking times (in seconds), by habituation
condition), to the mean of the last three habituation trials and each test trial type in
Experiment 1.
Thus, both groups of infants displayed recovery specifically to test videos novel
in gist relative to the habituation video they viewed, despite the fact that equivalent
perceptual novelty was present to both gist-novel and gist-familiar test videos.
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Discussion
Experiment 1 investigated whether 5- to 7- and 10- to 12-month-old infants could
readily gloss over changes in the perceptual motion details of a pushing or pulling action
and recognize a perceptually dissimilar action as being either consistent or inconsistent
with the familiar action. After seeing an actor grasp and then push a glass to another
person, both 5- to 7- and 10- to 12-month-olds looked longer at test videos in which the
actor reached out and touched the opposite side of the glass as if to pull it than at test
videos depicting the woman making contact with the glass as if to push it. Ten- to 12-
month-old infants-but not 5- to 7-month-oIds-who were shown the actor grasping and
then pulling the glass toward herself in the habituation phase showed the opposite pattern
of looking time at the test events. Looking preferences across both conditions for 10- to
12-month-olds, and in the observed-push condition for 5- to 7-month-olds, suggest that
infants did not regard perceptual changes consistent with the same inferred action--an
action familiar in gist-as indicative of a novel action category. In contrast, an
equivalent degree of perceptual change indicative of a novel inferred action-an action
inconsistent in gist-struck infants as noteworthy. In order for infants to be skilled
interpreters of human action, they need to be able to extract the gist of what people do
with objects after they grasp them. Findings from the current study suggest that infants
understand pushing and pulling actions earlier than previously documented (Casasola &
Cohen, 2000; Cohen et aI., 1995) and can categorize hand-to-glass touches as
potentiating either a push or a pull, and therefore augment the literature on infants' social
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cognition in providing some of the first evidence regarding infants' understanding of
object manipulation.
Methodologically, the current study is immune to certain criticisms of existing
looking-time findings regarding infants' action understanding (e.g., Sirois & Jackson,
2007). The concern is that infants may have preferred one stimulus in test (e.g., "new
goal" versus "new path" trials in Woodward's procedure) based merely on some salience-
enhancing perceptual aspect of the stimulus. In the present research, infants preferred
opposite test stimuli across the two habituation conditions, hence ruling out a simple
perceptual salience account.
An additional benefit of methodology used in the current experiment is the level
of control over the videos. Each habituation video used the same grasp clip that was
spliced with pushing or pulling motions that were each identical in length. Furthermore,
the latency between the onset of hand motion and the initial contact of the glass was
identical between the grasp clip used in the habituation stimuli and both of the test
stimuli. The level of methodological control used in the videos here is similar to the level
of control often only achieved by the ~se of animated stimuli. The current experiment
thus makes a significant contribution to the literature by promoting ecological validity
and generalizability to real-world human action while maintaining the benefits of
rigorous experimental control over the action stimuli shown to infants.
While the current results provide the strongest evidence to date that 10- to 12-
month-old infants are able to form abstract, gist-level categories of human action that
supercede variability in surface motion parameters, it is not clear how best to interpret
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younger infants' perfonnance. Younger infants in the observed-push condition showed a
similar pattern as older infants, whereas younger infants in the observed-pull condition
recovered interest (although not significantly so) to both types of test trials. As a group,
the younger infants also selectively recovered looking time to only gist-inconsistent test
trials. Perhaps, then, the period between 7-10 months marks important developments in
infants' ability to gloss over surface properties of actions to discern their deeper
functional significance.
One possible explanation for the locus of this developmental change lies in the
efficiency of infants' perceptual analysis of action. Infants in the observed-pull condition
saw an initial motion trajectory as the actor moved her hand away from the body in order
to grasp the glass, and then a subsequent trajectory reversal as she moved the glass
toward her body, whereas infants in the observed-push condition saw a unidirectional
motion trajectory away from the body. In order to extract the gist ofpulling from the
observed-pull stimulus, infants would have needed to identify the outward trajectory as
simply preparing to engage in the second motion component of pulling. Extracting the
gist of the observed-pull action, then, required an efficient perceptual analysis in which
infants ignore the first trajectory and focus on the second. Infants who saw the observed-
push stimulus were not faced with such a dilemma, perhaps contributing to their ability to
extract the gist of the action.
The current findings clearly indicate that infants are capable of a degree of
abstraction beyond the level of registering simple motion patterns; however, both lean
and rich interpretations are possible for the nature of the gist-level representation.
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According to a lean interpretation, infants saw object motion, predicted the motion
trajectory based on details of the actor's hand position in the test videos, and then looked
longer when the anticipated motion did not correspond with the observed motion in test.
This directional push or pull representation is still at the level of gist because when
infants saw the contact test videos, they did not simply process the observed hand
contact, but took an unseen action component (i.e., inferred object motion) as an
important characteristic by which to analyze the action. A richer reading of these data
would hold that infants formed a dyadic interaction representation, which encodes the
recipient of the object. On this reading, infants' representations of the actions could have
been as give or take, rather than push or pull. Experiment 3, reported below, investigated
whether 10- to 12-month-old infants are capable of construing object transfer events as
dyadic interactions, or whether they are limited to the leaner directional push construal.
Although the methodology used in the current study cannot disambiguate the
precise level of abstraction at which infants construed the push and pull stimuli used in
the current experiment, these findings nevertheless provide the strongest evidence to date
that 10- to 12-month-old infants are able to form abstract-level categories of human
action that supercede featural details. Data from 5- to 7-month-old infants further suggest
that this skill begins to develop in the first half of the first year of life, and also that
perceptual analyses of motion parameters influences gist extraction.
These data extend the seminal work of Woodward (1998; 1999) and Gergely and
colleagues (Gergely et aI., 1995) in showing that infants are capable of glossing over
even higher degrees of perceptual variability in order to interpret and categorize human
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action. Human action in everyday life varies based on context, objects involved, position
of the body in relation to manipulated objects, and the like. Faced with this variability, it
is striking that infants as young as 5- to 7-months can, Bruner's (1957) words, "go
beyond the information given" to register inferred functional commonalities, even when
this requires looking past gist-irrelevant surface characteristics of the motion stream.
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CHAPTER III
EXPERIMENT 2A
Overview
The results obtained in Experiment 1 suggest that by 10- to 12-months, infants
construe the gist of pushing and pulling actions at a level more abstract than the purely
perceptual. Infants have action categories of pushing and pulling that comprise multiple
possible exemplars in which featural information regarding the hand/object interaction is
allowed to vary. Additionally, those findings demonstrate that infants are capable of
generating inferences of likely future action based on surface features like hand position,
and then to categorize the action based on this generative inference rather than simply on
observed motion parameters.
Previous research investigating infants' processing of pushing and pulling events
performed by nonhuman agents found that 14-month-olds, but not 10-month-olds,
understand such events (Casasola & Cohen, 2000; Cohen et aI., 1995). Given the
contrast in age, combined with the novelty of the methodology employed in Experiment 1
and the presence of the effect on the first test trial only, replication is essential in order to
be confident of the robustness of the effect.
Experiment 2a was a replication of Experiment 1 with a sample of 11- to 12-
month-old infants. The stimuli and procedure were slightly modified to increase infants'
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attention throughout the study. Experiment 2b, reported in the next chapter, was a
replication ofExperiment 1 with a sample of 6- to 7-month-old infants.
Method
Participants
Sixteen 11- to 12-month-olds (M = 12 months, 6 days; range: 11 months 13 days
to 13 months 0 days; 8 girls, 8 boys) participated in the study. Nine additional infants
participated but were excluded from analyses due to parental over-involvement (n = 2),
interruptions during the test trial (n = 1; the infant's hair got caught in the parent's
sweater), or fussiness and inattention (n = 6), with the latter defined as infants for whom
more than three trials (habituation or test) had to be re-run due to insufficient looking
time.
Materials
The current experiment used the same stimuli as Experiment 1, except for the
following three modifications, all of which were designed to increase infants' attention
throughout the procedure. (1) During the entire procedure, mellow classical music
played in the background. Research on intersensory facilitation (Paden, 1974; Self,
1974) has found that auditory stimuli, such as music or the sound of the mother's voice,
can increase visual attention to presented stimuli. (2) A half-second black screen was
used to separate action sequences in both habituation and test trials. In Experiment 1,
one-second black screens were used. However, infants may have become bored after a
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full second ofblack screen and looked away due to this boredom, resulting in low overall
looking throughout the study. (3) A three-second pause was inserted at the end oftest
trials, rather than the one-second pause used in Experiment 1. The test sequences used in
Experiment 1 were three seconds long with a one-second pause at the end. It is possible
that infants in Experiment 1 found the rapid repetitions ofthe action sequence to be
aversive, leading them to look less to trials as the test phase progressed. The longer
pause was used in an attempt to make the test stimuli more pleasant and to give infants
more time in which to extract the gist of the action.
Procedure
The procedure used in Experiment 2a was identical to Experiment 1, with one
exception: given the presence of the predicted interaction on the first test trial only in
Experiment 1, infants in the current experiment viewed two presentations of each test
trial type, rather than three.
Results
As in Experiment 1, the question of interest was whether infants in the observed-
push condition looked longer to inferred-pull test videos than to inferred-push videos, and
whether infants in the observed-pull condition showed the opposite pattern.
Habituation Phase Analyses
Infants viewed, on average, 7.9 habituation trials (SD = 2.0) and accumulated a
total of75.45 seconds (SD = 29.69) oflooking over the course of the habituation phase.
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There were no differences between infants in the two habituation conditions with respect
to average looking times during the first three habituation trials, average looking time to
the last three habituation trials, the total amount oflooking time during the entire
habituation phase, or in the number of trials viewed during the habituation phase (all Fs <
1, ns). Fisher's exact test was used to examine whether infants in the two habituation
conditions differed in the frequency with which they met the habituation criterion before
moving to test trials; this analysis revealed no differences between infants in the
observed-push condition (4 met criterion, 4 did not) and infants in the observed-pull
condition (5 met criterion, 3 did not),p = .99.
Test Phase Analyses
Preliminary ANOVAs on infants' looking times toward test stimuli revealed that
none of the following factors had a significant effect on test performance: sex, whether or
not infants met the habituation criterion, or whether the gist of the first test trial was
consistent or inconsistent with the action seen in the habituation phase. Subsequent
analyses collapsed across these factors.
A repeated measures ANOVA with habituation condition (observed-push versus
observed-pull) as the between-subjects factor and test gist-type (gist-consistent versus
gist-inconsistent) and test trial pair (first and second) as within-subjects factors was
performed. 8 Unlike in Experiment 1, there was no main effect of test trial pair, nor did
test trial pair interact with other factors (Fs < 1.1, ns). This finding suggests that the
methodological changes introduced in Experiment 2a were successful in eliciting infants'
8 Two infants had parental interference during the second test trial pair and were not able to be included in
this analysis.
52
sustained attention throughout the procedure. Therefore, data were averaged across both
test trial pairs in the resulting repeated measures ANOVA,9 which had habituation
condition (observed-push versus observed-pull) as the between-subjects factor and test
gist-type (gist-consistent versus gist-inconsistent) as the within-subjects factor.
Recall that if infants in the current experiment processed the pushing and pulling
actions for gist, it would result in a significant main effect of test gist-type, such that
infants would look longer to test trials inconsistent in gist relative to the habituation
actions than to test trials consistent in gist.
The main effect for gist-type was marginally significant, F(1, 14) = 3.75, p < .09,
d' = .29 (see Figure 7). This result is qualified, however, by an unexpected interaction
between habituation condition and test gist-type, F(1, 14) = 7.03,p < .05 (see Figure 8).
Planned directional simple effects analyses tested for the effect separately within each
habituation condition. Infants in the observed-pull condition looked significantly longer
at test videos inconsistent in gist with the habituation action (M = 11.72, 3D = 8.07) than
at test videos consistent in gist (M = 7.37, 3D = 6.59), F(1, 14) = 10.18,p < .005, d' = .66.
Non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests also yielded significant results for this
comparison, Z = 2.10, P < .05. Infants in the observed-push condition showed no
significant differences in looking times at test trials consistent in gist (inferred-push
9 For the two infants whose data were not available for the second test trial pair, the looking times on the
first trial pair were used as their average values. This ANOVA was performed both with and without these
two infants in the model; test results did not change when those data were excluded. All results reported
below are of tests that included those data.
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average M = 9.27, SD = 9.28) and at test trials inconsistent in gist (inferred-push average
M= 8.70, SD = 9.49), F < 1, ns. lO
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Figure 7: Eleven- to 12-month-olds infants' mean looking times (in seconds),
collapsed across habituation condition, to the first three habituation trials, the mean of
the last three habituation trials, and each test trial type in Experiment 2a.
Looking Time Recovery Analyses
Directional paired t-tests examined whether infants in the two habituation
conditions selectively recovered looking time to test trials depicting an action
inconsistent in gist with the action seen during the habituation phase. Infants in the
observed-push condition looked longer, but not significantly so, at both test trials novel in
gist (inferred-pull average M = 8.70, SD = 9.49) and test trials familiar in gist (inferred-
10 Due to the effect of test trial pair in Experiment 1, post-hoc analyses were performed on the data from the
first test trial pair only. None of the results changed in these analyses.
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push average M = 9.27, SD = 9.28) relative to the average ofthe last three habituation
trials (M= 6.57, SD = 2.10), both ts < 1, ns.
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Figure 8: Eleven- to 12-month-olds infants' mean looking times (in seconds), by
habituation condition, to the mean of the last three habituation trials and each test trial
type in Experiment 2a.
In contrast to infants in the observed-push condition, infants in the observed-pull
condition showed significant increases in looking time from the average of the last three
habituation trials (M = 7.51, SD = 5.79) to the average of test trials novel in gist (inferred-
push averageM= 11.72, SD = 8.07), t(7) = 2.02,p < .05, d'= .57. However, as
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predicted, looking time to test trials familiar in gist showed a non-significant decrease
(inferred-pull average M= 7.37, SD = 6.59), t < 1, ns.
The results of both the ANOVA and the looking time recovery analyses suggest
that the data from infants in the observed-pull condition replicated the findings from
Experiment 1 and show that 11- and 12-month-old infants process at least some actions
for gist. However, Experiment 2a represents a failure to replicate Experiment 1 for
infants in the observed-push condition. It appears that infants in this condition did not
interpret the inferred-pUll test action as more inconsistent in gist to the habituation action
tha.l1 the inferred-push test action.
Discussion
Experiment 2a attempted to replicate the findings from Experiment 1 suggesting
that infants process pushing and pulling actions performed by a human actor for gist. The
current experiment tested only 11- to 12-month-old infants and modified the method in
order to elicit more sustained attention throughout the experiment. On the one hand, the
goal of sustaining infants' attention throughout the experimental procedure was met in
Experiment 2a. However, contrary to the results of Experiment 1 in which 10- to 12-
month-old infants processed both pushing and pulling actions for gist, only infants in the
observed-pull condition in the current experiment showed evidence of gist-processing.
Upon closer inspection, the lack of evidence for gist-related processing in infants
in the observed-push condition seems to be attributable, in part, to increased attention to
inferred-push test trials-infants looked for nearly 3 seconds longer at inferred-push test
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trials than the last three habituation trials, suggesting that the null results in this condition
may be due not only to less looking at test trials inconsistent in gist, but also to increased
attention to gist-consistent test trials.
A potential explanation of this finding relates to the use of a three-second still
frame pause at the end of test trials, in contrast with the one-second pause used in
Experiment 1. The pushing event depicted in the habituation phase involved the actor's
arm and the glass making a long, continuous motion trajectory away from the actor's
body. Therefore, when the actor made contact with the glass as if to push it but remained
motionless for three seconds, infants may have seen this stillness as violating their
expectation of what the actor was going to do; namely, push the glass. Perhaps this
would not have been a factor in Experiment 1, however, as the actor's remaining
motionless for only one second might not have violated infants' expectations to the same
degree as when she remained motionless for three-seconds while maintaining a posture
suggestive of pushing the glass.
In contrast to the pushing habituation stimulus, the motion in the pulling
habituation stimulus was not continuous. When the actor grasped the glass, she
interrupted the outward motion trajectory and introduced a discontinuity as she then
pulled the glass toward herself. It is possible that infants in the observed-pull condition
were not affected by the three-second pause as they were more used to the interruption in
the motion stream.
Note that this explanation is similar to the one proposed for the performance of 5-
to 7-month-old infants in Experiment 1. Those infants provided evidence of gist-related
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processing in the observed-push condition only, perhaps due to eased perceptual
processing demands for continuous, unidirectional movements relative to actions
involving changes in motion direction. In the current experiment, infants in the
observed-push condition may have also formed a stronger expectation about the timing of
the motion kinematics when the actions were unidirectional and therefore possessed
surface motion details that were easier to process. If these hypotheses are correct, they
suggest that gist-level processing is tightly bound with bottom-up processing of surface-
level detail. Infants' ability to extract the gist from human action relies on an efficient
bottom-up analysis of the motion stream; when infants succeed at both, they gloss over
surface-level details and focus on the gist, but when they are unsuccessful at either, they
rely more on the bottom-up analysis (Cohen & Cashon, 2006). These implications are
developed more fully in the General Discussion.
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CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENT 2B
Overview
Results from Experiment 2a did not perfectly replicate those from Experiment 1.
Specifically, the data from infants in the observed-pull condition beg the question of
whether the methodological changes introduced in Experiment 2a could also alter
younger infants' performance in the study. Experiment 2a tested 6- and 7-month-old
infants on the same procedure used in Experiment 2a, save one change. Due to the
possibility that the three-second pause at the end of test trials caused the push test videos
to appear odd after viewing the pushing action in habituation, but did not have the same
effect for the pull test videos, a one-second still frame pause was used at the end of test
trials.
Method
Participants
Sixteen 6- to 7-month-olds (M = 6 months, 29 days; range: 6 months 2 days to 7
months 18 days; 7 girls, 9 boys) participated in the study. Seven additional infants
participated, but were excluded from analyses due to parental over-involvement (n = 1),
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data with extreme outliers (n = 1),11 or fussiness and inattention (n = 5), whieh was
defined as infants for whom more than three trials (habituation or test) had to be re-run
due to insufficient looking time.
Materials and Procedure
The current experiment used the same stimuli as Experiment 2a, except that a
one-second still frame pause was used at the end of test trials. The procedure used in the
current experiment was identical to Experiment 2a.
Results
Habituation Phase Analyses
Infants viewed, on average, 9.1 habituation trials (SD = 1.7) and accumulated a
total of 63.54 seconds (SD = 22.74) of looking over the course of the habituation phase.
There were no differences between infants in the two habituation conditions with respect
to average looking times during the first three habituation trials or in the number of trials
viewed during the habituation phase (both Fs < 1, ns). However, infants in the observed-
push condition looked significantly longer over the course of the habituation phase (M =
78.23, SD = 20.74) than infants in the observed-pull condition (M= 48.84, SD =13.58),
F(l, 14) = l1.14,p < .005, d'= 1.45. Furthermore, infants in the observed-push
condition displayed marginally significantly longer looking, on average, to the last three
habituation trials (M = 8.00, SD = 4.09) than infants in the observed-pull condition (M =
II The outliers were in the direction predicted by the hypothesis; their omission, therefore, did not favor the
hypothesis.
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4.91, SD = 2.86), F(1, 14) = 3.91,p < .07, d' = .86 (see Figure 9). Fisher's exact test was
used to examine whether infants in the two habituation conditions differed in the
frequency with which they met the habituation criterion before moving to test trials; this
analysis revealed no differences between infants in the obsenTed-push condition (3 met
criterion, 5 did not) and infants in the observed-pull condition (2 met criterion, 6 did not),
p= .99.
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Figure 9: Six- to 7-month-old infants' mean looking times (in seconds), by habituation
condition, to the first three habituation trials, the mean ofthe last three habituation trials,
and each test trial type in Experiment 2b. The lines with diamond joints represent the
data from infants in the observed-push condition; the lines with triangle joints represent
the data from infants in the observed-pull condition.
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Test Phase Analyses
Consistent with condition differences in looking time during the habituation
phase, infants in the observed-push condition displayed significantly longer looking, on
average, to both test trial types (M = 7.97, SD = 3.51) than infants in the observed-pull
condition (M= 4.27, SD = 1.04), F(l, 14) = 9.49,p < .01, d'= 1.33 (see Figure 9). No
other effects were statistically significant.
Discussion
Five- to 7-month-old infants in the current study did not preferentially look at
either gist-consistent or gist-inconsistent test trials. Due to the unexpected findings that
infants in the observed-push condition looked significantly longer throughout the
experiment, it is difficult to draw any conclusions from Experiment 2b. It is possible that
the failure to replicate the findings from the observed-push condition Experiment 1 was
due, in part, to a ceiling effect. Average looking to the last three habituation trials, gist-
inconsistent test trials, and gist-consistent test trials among infants in the observed-push
condition in the current experiment were all longer than comparable looking times among
infants in both conditions in Experiment 1 and the observed-pull condition in the current
experiment. In other words, according to every metric, infants in the observed-push
condition, as a group, looked longer than any other group of 5- to 7-month-old infants in
Experiments 1 or 2b. Perhaps those infants simply looked to fatigue during test trials.
In contrast, infants in the observed-pull condition showed minimal attention
during test trials, indicating a possible floor effect. Regardless of test trial type, those
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infants watched only a single presentation of the test action during a single test trial,
whereas infants in the observed-pull condition in Experiment 1 showed increased looking
to both test trial types relative to the last three habituation trials.
The methodological differences between the current experiment and Experiment 1
were introduced in order to increase infants' attention throughout the study. The findings
from the current experiment show that to the extent these changes were successful in
increasing attention, they did so only in the observed-push condition. It is difficult to
provide an account for this pattern other than random variation as the stimuli were nearly
identical to those used in Experiment 1.
It is also possible that the findings from 5- to 7-month-olds in Experiment 1 were
spurious and that infants at this age are not yet capable of processing for gist, as was
hypothesized before Experiment 1. Future studies on this topic should attempt to develop
stimuli that gamer infants' interest and contain surface motion details that promote their
processing of the relevant structure. Research has shown that infants look longer at live
events than at videotaped presentations of the same event (Pierroutsakos & Diener,
2007); the use of live actors who engage in actions that promote efficient perceptual
analysis may be useful for future investigations into young infants' processing for gist.
------------------- _._...- -_..._-------
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CHAPTER V
EXPERIMENT 3
Overview
The previous experiments demonstrate that infants form action categories based
on the gist of an action. These studies, however, share a shortcoming with much of the
existing literature in that they focus on a single action comparison, in this case actions
involving sliding an object to oneself or another person. If infants generally process
action by forming gist-based categories, then they should use this strategy when
interpreting other actions, as well. Experiment 3 tested the hypothesis that 10- to 12-
month-old infants would be sensitive to the gist of an additional action comparison:
opening or closing a door.
Despite the suggestive evidence from Experiment 1 that 5- to 7-month-olds can
process some actions for gist, the current experiment tested only 10- to 12-month-old
infants. This change was made because infants who participated in Experiment 3 also
participated in Experiment 4 during the same visit to the laboratory. As no studies to my
knowledge have investigated infants' social-cognitive skills on two different tasks in the
same experimental session, Experiments 3 and 4 were paired in order fill this gap and test
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for individual differences in social cognition. 12 This design feature, however, left
younger infants ill-suited for the task for two reasons First, younger infants in
Experiment 1 had lower looking times throughout the experiment than older infants,
casting doubt on whether 5- to 7-month-olds would be likely to complete both
experiments. Second, the stimuli used in Experiment 4 were considerably more complex
in that they contained several action components, including eye contact between the
actors and joint attention on an object, and prior research suggests that it is not until the
end of the first year oflife that infants develop the ability to interpret a means-ends action
sequences (Sommerville & Woodward, 2005a; Woodward & Sommerville, 2000).
Therefore, the sample was restricted to 10- to l2-month-olds.
Method
Participants
Sixteen 10- to 12-month-olds (M = 11 months, 6 days; range: 10 months 18 days
to 12 months 15 days; 8 girls, 8 boys) participated in the study. Nine additional infants
participated, but were excluded from analyses due to technical problems (n = 1), parental
interference (n = 2), or were unable to finish the study due to fussiness and inattention (n
= 6).
12 Unfortunately, only twelve infants completed both experiments. This resulted in cross-experiment
analyses that lacked statistical power and which did not reveal any relationship between performance in
Experiments 3 and 4.
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All infants who participated in Experiment 3 also participated in Experiment 4.
Infants were randomly assigned to participate in either Experiment 3 first (n = 8) or
Experiment 4 first (n = 8). Twelve infants completed both studies.
Materials
Infants were habituated to one of two action sequences involving either opening
or closing an oven door. In the beginning ofboth habituation videos, a smiling male
wearing a blue long sleeved shirt was seen standing in a bent position near an oven, the
door of which was ajar. The habituation video used in the observed-open condition,
depicted the actor grasping an oven handle with an underhand grip and pulling the door
open (see Figure lOA). The video used in the observed-close condition depicted the
same actor using an underhand grip when grasping and closing the door (see Figure lOB).
On alternating habituation trials the actor used his right or left hand to open or close the
door, resulting in four total habituation videos. Which hand was used to manipulate the
door on the first test trial was counterbalanced across infants. 13
The time-course of all four habituation videos was identical. In all videos the
actor grasped the handle 2.5 seconds into the video. The actor then pulled the door
handle to open the door, stopped at the 4.3-second mark of the video and held the
position for three seconds. After the 7.3-second event was completed, a half-second
black screen appeared and the event was repeated.
13 Infants saw the action perfonned with both hands because, in test, the actor used his right hand on
inferred-open trials and his left hand on inferred-close trials. By alternating use of right- and left-hand
habituation trials infants were not able to develop an expectation regarding which hand the actor favored,
thus any preferences at test could not be driven by increased attention to test trial types depicting the actor
using a new hand to contact the door.
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(A) Observed-Open Condition
1. Start
1. Start
1. Start
1. Start
2. Right Hand Grasp
2. Left Hand Grasp
(B) Observed-Close Condition
2. Right Hand Grasp
2. Left Hand Grasp
3. Open
3. Open
3. Close
3. Close
Figure 10: Illustrative still frame images from the videos used in the habituation phase
of Experiment 3. Images from the observed-open condition are in the top two rows and
images from the observed-closed condition are in the bottom two rows. In each
condition, on alternating trials the actor used his right hand (top row in each section) or
left hand (bottom row in each section) to open or close the door.
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At test, infants saw inferred-open and inferred-close trials, each presented twice
and in altemating order, counterbalanced across infants. Both test trials started with the
actor in the same position as in the beginning of habituation trials. In inferred-open test
trials, the actor put the palm of his right hand on the inside of the door, allowing him to
potentially open, but not close, the door (see Figure 11). In inferred-close trials, the actor
put the palm of his left hand on the outside face of the door handle, allowing him to
potentially close, but not open, the door.
Inferred-Open Test Trials
1. Start 2. Open contact
Inferred-Close Test Trials
1. Start 2. Close contact
Figure 11: Illustrative still frame images from the videos used in the test phase of
Experiment 3.
Each test video had the same time-course; the actor made contact with the door at
the 2.S-second mark and held the position for 1.5 seconds until the 4-second video ended.
After a half-second black screen, the video was repeated.
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Procedure
Habituation. Infants sat on a parent's lap approximately 70 em away from the 24
x 33 em video screen. During habituation trials, infants' looking time was recorded
throughout the entire action sequence. On each trial, the video continued to play until
either five presentations of the video had been completed (total duration 38.5 seconds) or
the infant looked away for two consecutive seconds, whichever came first. If infants did
not accumulate at least three seconds of viewing on anyhabituation trial, the trial was
repeated. (A three-second criterion was selected because the actor did not begin to move
the object until three seconds into the video). The habituation criterion was set as the
first three-trial sequence over which infants accumulated 30 seconds or more oflooking
time (i.e., where the average looking time per trial was at least ten seconds). The
habituation phase ended when either eight trials had been completed or the average
looking to the two l4 most recent trials was less than 50% of the habituation criterion,
whichever came first. Infants' looking time was coded online by an observer using
custom software (Loucks & Vukcevich, in preparation) that automatically calculated
habituation criteria and advanced to test trials when appropriate.
14 The change from the standard three-trial average used to check whether infants met the habituation
criterion in Experiments 1, 2a, and 2b to the two-trial average used in Experiments 3 and 4 was made in
order to facilitate infants' reaching the criterion and advancing to test trials in a timely manner. Several of
the infants omitted from the analysis due to fussiness in the previous experiments accrued several re-run
trials due to insufficient looking at the end of the habituation phase, a possible sign that infants were bored
with the habituation action despite not having met the habituation criterion. Even infants included in the
sample seemed to have difficulty reaching the habituation criterion, in part because their average looking to
the first three trials was short (e.g., M = 9.88 seconds in Experiment 1). This made it difficult for infants to
have three consecutive trials the average of which was both over two seconds (the minimum looking time
needed for a valid trial) as well as below 4.94 seconds (50% of the average of the first three). By using a
two-trial average-rather than three-to check for habituation, and requiring that the habituation criterion
not be set until the average of three trials exceeded ten seconds, it was hoped that more infants would reach
criterion and move to test trials when bored with the habituation stimulus.
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Test. All infants saw two presentations each of infelTed-open and infelTed-close
test actions in alternating order. On each test trial, the video continued to play until either
the infant looked away for two consecutive seconds after accumulating at least two
seconds of looking time, or until the video was presented a total of seven times (total
duration 33.7 seconds). (A two-second criterion was used for test trials because the
actor's hand configuration foreshadowed opening or closing within two seconds of the
start of the video). If infants did not accumulate at least two seconds of looking on any
test trial, that trial was repeated. The order of presentation of the two test trial types was
counterbalanced such that halfof the infants in each habituation condition had a new
recipient/old location trial first, and the other half had the old recipient/new location trial
first.
Results
Habituation Phase Analyses
Infants viewed, on average, 7.8 habituation trials (SD = .4) and accumulated a
total of 69.61 seconds (SD = 25.24) oflooking over the course of the habituation phase.
There were no differences between infants in the two habituation conditions with respect
to average looking times during the first three habituation trials, average looking time to
the last three habituation trials, the total amount oflooking time during the entire
habituation phase, or in the number oftrials viewed during the habituation phase (all Fs <
1.8, ns). A Fisher's exact test was used to examine whether infants in the two habituation
conditions differed in the frequency with which they met the habituation criterion before
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moving to test trials; this analysis revealed no significant differences between the
frequency with which infants in the observed-open condition reached criterion (1 met
criterion, 7 did not) and the frequency with which infants in the observed-close condition
reached criterion (3 met criterion,S did not),p = .60.
Test Phase Analyses
The question of interest in Experiment 3 was whether infants, regardless of
habituation condition, looked longer at gist-inconsistent than gist-consistent test trials. It
was predicted that infants would display significantly longer looking to gist-inconsistent
test trials than gist-consistent test trials, resulting in a significant main effect of test gist-
type.
Preliminary ANOVAs on infants' looking times toward test stimuli revealed that
sex, order of presentation of test stimuli, and infants' tendency to meet the habituation
criterion yielded neither significant main effects nor interacted with other factors;
therefore, subsequent analyses collapsed across these factors.
A repeated measures ANOVA with habituation condition (observed-open versus
observed-close) as the between-subjects factor and test gist-type (gist-consisteJ?t versus
gist-inconsistent) and test trial pair (first or second) as the within-subjects factors was
performed on the data. There was a significant effect of test trial pair, F(1, 14) = 6.25,p
< .05, such that infants' attention generally decreased across the test phase. However, the
interaction between trial pair and gist-type was not significant (F < 1, ns), and none of the
analyses reported below changed depending on whether the model included the average
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of both habituation trials or the first test trial pair only. Therefore, subsequent analyses
collapsed across trial pair.
After removing test trial pair from the analysis, a repeated measures ANOVA
with habituation condition (observed-push versus observed-pull) as the between-subjects
factor and test gist-type (gist-consistent versus gist-inconsistent) as the within-subjects
factor was performed on the data. The predicted main effect of gist type was significant,
F(1, 14) = 17.41,p < .001, d'= 1.14 (see Figure 12). Infants looked significantly longer
at gist-inconsistent test trials (M = 11.03, SD = 5.82) than at gist-consistent test trials (M
= 5.60, SD = 3.05). Non-parametric analyses corroborated the results of the ANOVA;
infants looked significantly longer at gist-inconsistent trials than at gist-consistent trials
(Wilcoxon signed ranks Z = 2.39, P < .05). There was no main effect of habituation
condition or interaction between habituation condition and test gist-type in the ANOVA,
indicating that infants in the two habituation conditions did not differ significantly in
their looking patterns in test.
Planned directional simple effects analyses tested for the predicted effect within
each habituation condition. Infants in the observed-open condition showed significantly
longer looking to gist-inconsistent test trials (inferred-close M = 10.83, SD = 5.21) than to
gist-consistent test trials (inferred-open M= 5.00, SD = 3.12), F(1, 14) = 12.56,p < .005,
d' = 1.28 (see Figure 13). Infants in the observed-close condition also looked
significantly longer to gist-inconsistent test trials (inferred-open M = 11.22, SD = 6.74)
than to gist-consistent test trials (inferred-close M = 6.20, SD = 3.07), F(1, 14) = 5.56, p <
.05, d' = .80. Together, these analyses show that infants' looking to test trials was driven
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primarily by whether or not the inferred action was consistent with the gist of the action
seen during habituation, rather than the actual behavior (i.e., open versus close).
Figure 12: Ten- to 12-month-old infants' mean looking times (in seconds), collapsed
across habituation condition, to the first three habituation trials, the mean of the last
two habituation trials, and each test trial type in Experiment 3.
Looking Time Recovery Analyses
Directional paired t-tests examined whether infants selectively recovered looking
time to gist-inconsistent test trials relative to the last viewed two habituation trials. As
predicted, infants looked significantly longer at gist-inconsistent test trials (M = 11.03,
3D = 5.82) compared to the average of the last two viewed habituation trials (M = 7.10,
3D = 2.40), t(15) = 2.27, p < .05, d' = .71. In contrast, there was a significant decrease in
looking to gist-consistent test trials (M= 5.60, 3D = 3.05), t(15) = -1.83,p < .05, d'= .69.
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Figure 13: Ten- to 12-month-old infants' mean looking times (in seconds), by
habituation condition, to the mean ofthe last two habituation trials and each test trial
type in Experiment 3.
Discussion
Experiment 3 investigated whether 10- to 12-month-old infants used gist-related
processing when observing an actor opening or closing a door. Infants who observed an
actor open an oven door in the habituation phase looked longer at test trials in which the
actor contacted the door in such a way that would enable him to close-but not open-
the door than at trials in which he contacted the door as if to open it. The opposite pattern
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was obtained among infants in the observed-close condition; at test, they preferred to
look at test trials in which the actor appeared likely to open the door than in trials in
which he appeared likely to close it. As in previous experiments, these findings attest to
infants' ability to gloss over substantial perceptual variability between action exemplars
in order to categorize the actions based on a shared gist.
On a methodological note, the length of still-frame pauses at the end of test
actions (1.5 seconds) were closer in duration to those used in Experiment 1 (l second)
than Experiment 2a (3 seconds). As the methodology used throughout this dissertation is
novel, the experiments reported throughout had to empirically verify which pause
latencies were optimal for the experimental design. The findings from the current
experiment, as well as from Experiment 1, suggest that pause lengths between 1 and 1.5
seconds allow infants enough time to extract the gist of the action without disrupting their
predictions regarding the actor's movements.
The stimuli used in the current experiment contribute to the ecological validity of
the current package of studies, as well as to the extant literature on infant social
cogniti~n. In the previous experiments in this dissertation, and in the majority of
research on infant social cognition, the action exemplars depicted in the stimuli were
performed in visually-sparse contexts. When experiments employ stimuli that depict
human action, the adult actor is often seated at a table containing one or two distinct
objects, and in front of a curtain or a bare wall. Simplifying the visual environment is
obviously critical for maintaining experimental control and ensuring that infants are
attending to the appropriate aspects of the stimulus. However, successful action analysis
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in the real world has to contend with a large amount of visual clutter in order to identify
the gist of the action. Therefore, experiments that use stimuli in contexts containing
potentially distracting visual stimuli, such as the current experiment and the seminal
research by Baldwin et al. (2001), are impOliant in extrapolating laboratory findings to
real-world action processing contexts.
A potential limitation ofthe current experiment relates to whether the actions
shown to infants were qualitatively distinct from the actions in Experiments 1, 2a, and 2b.
The opening actions in both the habituation and test phases of the current experiment
depicted an actor pulling a door, whereas the closing actions depicted the actor pushing
the door. As such, one might question whether the findings of Experiment 3 provide any
insight into infants' gist-related processing beyond that provided by the previous
experiments, which depicted an actor pushing and pulling a small object.
Against this critique, however, there are at least two arguments. First, research by
Woodward and Sommerville (2000) suggests that 11- to l2-month-old infants are
sensitive to the functional affordances enabled by opening a container, lending
plausibility to the argument that infants in the current experiment were sensitive to the
functional affordance-i.e., the gist-of the opening and closing actions performed on
the door. Second, the pushing and pulling actions depicted in the current experiment are
distinct, in several surface motion parameters, from the pushing and pulling actions
depicted in the previous experiments. For instance, in Experiments 1, 2a, and 2b, the
actor was shown using her right hand to slide a small object on the horizontal plane
between two people. In contrast, the actor in Experiment 3 alternated between using his
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right and left hand to move an object part (the door of an oven) around a fulcrum in the
absence of another person. Categorizing the video depicting pushing from the previous
experiments together with the video depicting pushing from the current experiment
together would require sophisticated gist-level processing mechanism in its own right.
Therefore, regardless of whether infants interpreted the actions as push and pull or open
and close, the current experiment provides additional supporting evidence that infants can
interpret a range of action exemplars for gist.
Findings from the current experiment extend the findings from the previous
experiments in this dissertation in demonstrating the robustness of infants' ability to
process action for gist. Specifically, these findings show that infants' gist-related
processing skills are not limited to sliding an object on a table. This suggests that by at
least 10- to 12-months of age, gist-related processing skills are part of infants' more
general action-processing strategies.
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CHAPTER VI
EXPERIMENT 4
Overview
Two questions motivated Experiment 4. The first question was whether infants
categorize actions on the basis of a shared gist when action exemplars differ on several
motion parameters. Experiments 1, 2a, and 3 provided evidence that 10- to 12-month-old
infants who observe an action involving object manipulation can gloss over changes in
hand configuration and whether the object is moved and categorize those actions at the
more abstract gist level. However, the action exemplars shown to infants in the
habituation and test phases of those experiments were highly similar in several other
parameters, such as the direction of eye gaze, the number of hands used, and the position
of the actors and objects at the beginning of the action. Each of these motion parameters
may vary between action exemplars infants observe outside of the laboratory. If the gist-
processing skills infants demonstrated in previous experiments do, in fact, operate when
infants process everyday action, they must be able to contend with even greater
perceptual variability between action exemplars than was established in the previous
experiments. Experiment 4 investigated whether infants are capable of categorizing
actions by a shared gist when action exemplars depicting object transfer differ on several
motion parameters, including hand configuration, whether or not the actor moves the
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object, the number of hands used to contact the object, the spatial location of the actors,
whether or not the actors establish eye contact, and whether the recipient of the object in
a giving action interacts with the object.
The second question that motivated the current research was whether the results
from previous experiments point to infants' preference to categorize actions at the more
abstract gist level relative to a purely perceptual level, or whether those results might also
indicate that infants prefer to categorize actions at more abstract levels of gist relative to
less abstract levels of gist (cf. Cohen et aI., 2002). Experiment 4 was designed such that
there were [at least] two potential gist-level interpretations of the action; in question was
the level at which infants would prefer to categorize the actions. The two potential gist-
level construals will be clearer after a brief description ofthe methodology.
The current experiment married the gist-processing methodology used throughout
this dissertation with the object-switch methodology used by Woodward (1998) to
investigate infants' understanding of goal-directed grasps. Infants in the habituation
phase of the current experiment were shown an actor seated at a table with two other
people seated on either side of the actor. The actor grasped and moved an object to one
of these people, released the object, after which the recipient grasped it. At test, the two
people switched locations and infants saw two test trial types. In the first test trial type,
the actor contacted the object as if to push it to the opposite side of the table than she had
pushed it during habituation, but toward the same person. In the second test trial type,
the actor contacted the object as if to push it to the same spatial location as in habituation,
but toward a new person.
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If infants interpreted the gist of the habituation videos as the actor moving an
object to a specific spatial location-i.e., the right or left side of the table--they should
have expected the actor to move the object to the same location in test trials. This would
result in longer looking at test trials depicting the actor preparing to push the object to the
new location. Note that this directional push interpretation is still a gist-related construal
ofthe action and would suggest that infants are capable of glossing over even more
variability in motion parameters-e.g., changes in eye gaze, the number of hands used,
and the location of the actors-than demonstrated in previous experiments.
If, however, infants encoded the identity of the recipient in the object transfer
event, then they should show the opposite pattern, looking longer to test trials in which
the actor contacted the object as if to move it to the same location as in habituation, but to
the new recipient who was seated there. This construal of the action represents a more
abstract level of interpretation, as infants would need to not only understand the gist of
moving an object to a particular spatial location, but also would need to recognize that the
identity of the agents in the dyadic interaction is a critical feature of the gist of the action.
Based on prior research ~emonstrating that 10- to 12-month-old infants are capable of
interpreting at least some interactions between multiple agents (Hamlin et aI., 2007;
Kuhlmeier et aI., 2003; Sodian et aI., 2004), I hypothesized that infants would be capable
of the more abstract level of processing, encoding the identity of the recipient in their
representation of the action. I thus predicted that infants would look longer at new
recipient/old location test trials than at old recipient/new location test trials.
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Method
Participants
Sixteen 10- to 12-month-old infants (M = 11 months, 12 days; range: 10 months
18 days to 12 months 18 days; 8 girls, 8 boys) participated in the study. Nine additional
infants participated, but were excluded from analyses due to technical problems (n = 1),
ambient noises that distracted the infant during test (n = 1), or inability to finish the study
due to fussiness and inattention (n = 7).
All infants who participated in Experiment 4 also participated in Experiment 3.
Infants were randomly assigned to participate in either Experiment 3 first (n= 8) or
Experiment 4 first (n = 8). Twelve infants completed both studies.
Materials
During the habituation phase infants viewed a digitized action sequence that
depicted a female actor giving an object to one of two people who were sitting on
opposite sides of a table (see Figure 14). The recipient (male or female) and the location
of the recipient (right or left side of the actor) were counterbalanced, resulting in four
habituation videos. The actor wore a brown long sleeved jacket, as well as yellow gloves
intended to draw infants' attention to the motion of the actor's hands. The other two
participants were a male wearing a long sleeved blue shirt and a female wearing a long
sleeved green shirt.
The action sequence began with all three people looking at the object and smiling.
The actor and the recipient then looked at each other while the observer looked at the
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actor. (Throughout the video clip, the observer's eye-gaze always mirrored the direction
of the recipient's eye-gaze). All three participants then looked at the object, after which
the actor grasped the object with two hands and moved it in front of the recipient. The
actor then withdrew her hands and the recipient grasped the object with his or her hand
that was closest to the video camera. After grasping the object, the recipient and the actor
looked at each other and smiled broadly while the observer also looked at the actor and
smiled widely. This pose was held for two seconds until the end of the trial. The entire
action sequence lasted 11.7 seconds (same for all four versions of the habituation videos).
(1)
(4)
(2)
(5)
(3)
Figure 14: Illustrative still-frame images from one ofthe videos used in the habituation
phase of Experiment 4. The sequence was the same for the other conditions formed by
varying whether the male or female received the toy and the side ofthe table on which
the recipient sat.
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After the end of the habituation phase, but before the beginning oftest trials,
infants saw an orient trial in which the recipient and onlooker had switched locations (see
Figure 15). The orient trial was a still-frame image of the three people looking at the
object and smiling. The orient trial allowed infants to observe the new locations ofthe
actors, increasing the probability that looking time to test trials would be driven by
interpretations ofthe actions, rather than the perceptual novelty ofthe location switch.
The onlooker and recipient remained in the new, switched locations throughout each of
the test trials.
Orient trial
New recipient/Old location
test trial
Old recipient/New location
test trial
Figure 15: Illustrative still frame images from one of the videos used in the test phase of
Experiment 4. After an orient trial, infants saw test trials that began with the actors
seated at the table as in orient trials, followed by the actor moving her hand and making
contact with the object; the still frames shown for the test trials are ofthe position of final
contact.
All infants saw two test trial types. Test actions began with all three participants
in the same pose as in the orient trial: looking at the object and smiling. In old
recipient/new location trials, the actor reached out her hand and contacted the object with
her palm as if to push it to the old recipient who was now sitting on the opposite side of
the table (see Figure 15). Her hand was angled in such a way that she could only push it
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toward one of the two other participants. In new recipient/old location trials, she engaged
in the same action, except that her angled palm was placed on the object in a manner that
would enable her to push the object to the same spatial location but toward a new
recipient (the observer from the habituation phase).
There were four test actions in all, although an individual infant only saw the two
versions ofthe video that depicted the recipient and onlooker on the opposite sides of the
table relative to where they sat during the habituation video. In each of the four videos, it
took the actor roughly 2.6 seconds to contact the object and she held the pose for roughly
1.4 seconds until the video clip ended. Each action sequence lasted 4 seconds.
Procedure
Habituation. Infants sat on a parent's lap approximately 70 cm away from the 24
x 33 em video screen. During habituation trials, infants' looking time was recorded
throughout the entire action sequence. Each action sequence was followed by a half-
second presentation of a black screen, whereupon the sequence was repeated. On each
trial, the video continued to play until infants either looked away from the screen for at
least two consecutive seconds or four loops ofthe video were presented, whichever came
first. Ifinfants did not accumulate at least four seconds of viewing on any habituation
trial, the trial was repeated. (A four-second criterion was selected because the actor did
not begin to move the object until four seconds into the video). The habituation criterion
was set as the first three-trial sequence over which infants accumulated 30 seconds or
more oflooking time (i.e., where the average looking time per trial was at least ten
seconds). The habituation phase ended when either eight trials had been completed or the
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average looking to the two most recent trials was less than 50% of the habituation
criterion, whichever came first. Infants' looking time was coded online by an observer
using custom software (Loucks & Vukcevich, in preparation) that automatically
calculated habituation criteria and advanced to test trials when appropriate.
Test. Although infants participated in just one of the four habituation conditions
made by counterbalancing the recipient (male or female) and his or her location (right or
left side of the table). all infants saw new recipient/old location and old recipient/new
location test actions in alternating order.
The test phase was preceded by an orient trial. After the orient trial, infants saw
two trial pairs, with each pair containing one of each type oftest action. As in
habituation, each action sequence in a given test trial was followed by a half-second
black screen and repeated. A test trial ended when the infant looked away for two
consecutive seconds after accumulating at least two seconds oflooking time, or until six
presentations of the action sequence had been completed, whichever came first. (A two-
second criterion was used for test trials because the actor's hand configuration clarified
the direction of intended object movement within two seconds of the start of the video).
If infants did not accumulate at least two seconds of looking on any test trial, that trial
was repeated. The order of presentation ofthe two test trial types was counterbalanced
such that half ofthe infants in each habituation condition had a new recipient/old location
trial first and the other half had the old recipient/new location trial first.
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Results
Habituation Phase Analyses
Infants viewed, on average, 7.5 habituation trials (SD = .8) and accumulated a
total of 169.47 seconds (SD = 67.04) oflooking over the course of the habituation phase.
One-way ANOVAs were performed to look for condition differences in average looking
times to the average of the first three habituation trials, average looking time to the last
three habituation trials, the total amount oflooking time during the entire habituation
phase between the various habituation conditions, and the number oftrials viewed during
the habituation phase. Infants who saw the actor give the object to the recipient on her
left in habituation did not differ significantly in any of these tests from infants who saw
the actor give the object to the recipient on her right (all Fs < 2.9, all ps > .11). Infants
who, in habituation, saw the actor give the object to the female recipient viewed
marginally significantly more habituation trials (M = 7.88, SD = .35) than infants who
saw the actor give the object to the male recipient (M= 7.13, SD = .99), F(I, 14) = 4.07,
p < .07, d' = .25. (To preview, the sex ofthe recipient did not predict any patterns during
the test phase). There were no significant differences between the two habituation trial
types with respect to any of the habituation looking time measures (all Fs < 2.9, allps >
.11).
Additional one-way ANOVAs examined whether infants who met the habituation
criterion differed from infants who did not meet the habituation criterion with respect to
overall looking time during habituation, average looking to the first three habituation
trials, and average looking to the last two viewed habituation trials. Habituators had
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significantly longer looking times over the first three habituation trials (M = 37.70
seconds, SD = 5.99) than non-habituators (M = 15.55 seconds, SD = 8.35), F(I, 14) =
26.82, p < .001, d' = 2.27 (see Figure 16). In addition, habituators displayed marginally
significant longer overall looking during the habituation phase (M = 203.47 seconds, SD
= 50.52) than non-habituators (M= 143.03 seconds, SD = 68.67), F(I, 14) = 4.15,p <
.07, d' = .90. This finding is startling given that habituators viewed fewer habituation
trials (M = 6.86, SD= .90) than non-habituators (who viewed eight habituation trials
without meeting the habituation criterion). There were no differences between the two
groups of infants with regard to average looking over the last two viewed habituation
trials (F < 1.1, ns).
Two Fisher's exact tests were used to examine whether infants in the four
habituation conditions differed in the frequency with which they met the habituation
criterion before moving to test trials. The first analysis compared frequencies between
infants who saw the actor give the object to the person on her left in the habituation phase
(5 met criterion, 3 did not) to infants who saw the actor give the object to the person on
her right (2 met criterion, 6 did not). This analysis revealed no significant differen~e
between infants in the two conditions, p = .31. A similar analysis compared frequencies
between infants who saw the male receive the object in the habituation phase (5 met
criterion, 3 did not) and infants who saw the female receive the object (2 m~t criterion, 6
did not). This analysis revealed no differences between infants in the two conditions, p =
.31.
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Test Phase Analyses
The question of interest in Experiment 3 was whether infants would show
increased attention to new recipient/old location test trials relative to old recipient/new
location trials. Such a pattern would suggest that infants encoded the gist of the action
shown in habituation as involving a social exchange, rather than a directional push of an
object to a particular spatial location.
2 3
Habituation trials
Last 2 Mean Test
Figure 16: Ten- to 12-month-old infants' mean looking times (in seconds) to the first
three habituation trials, the mean of the last two viewed habituation trials, and each test
trial type in Experiment 4. The lines with square joints represent the data from infants
who met the habituation criterion; the lines with circle joints represent the data from
infants who did not meet the habituation criterion.
ANOVAs on infants' looking times toward test stimuli revealed that none of the
following factors had a significant effect on test performance: sex, test trial pair, which
gist-type of test trial was seen first, whether the male or female received the object in
88
habituation, or whether the object was given to the recipient on the actor's left or right.
Subsequent analyses collapsed across these factors.
Preliminary analyses revealed an unexpected result: whether infants reached the
habituation criterion had a significant effect on the infants' test performance (but did not
interact with any independent variables). Therefore, the data were analyzed using a
repeated measures ANOVA with test gist-type (new recipient vs. new location) as the
within-subjects factor and whether or not infants met the habituation criterion as the
between subject factor (7 met criterion, 9 did not). In this analysis, the predicted main
effect oftest gist-type was marginally significant, F(l, 14) = 3A8,p < .09, d' = AD (see
Figure 17). Infants looked longer at new recipient trials (M = 15.32, SD = 6.68) than at
new location trials (M = 12048, SD = 5.53). However, there was a significant interaction
between whether infants met the habituation criterion and test gist-type, F(l, 14) = 8.19,
p < .05. As suggested by Figures 16 and 17, habituators appeared to look longer at new
recipient trials, whereas non- habituators did not prefer either test trial type.
The significant effect of reaching the habituation criterion suggests that the results
from the ANOVA above may be misleading and that a simple effects analysis would be a
more appropriate analytic approach. Post-hoc directional simple effects analyses-
controlling for multiple comparisons by setting family-wise a at 0.5 with a Bonferroni
correction-were therefore used to test for the effect separately within the groups of
habituators and the non-habituators. Habituators looked significantly longer on new
recipient test trials (M = 18.22 seconds, SD = 7.62) than on new location test trials (M =
9.66 seconds, SD = 4.29), F(l, 14) = 5.17,p < .05, d'= 1.11. Non- habituators did not
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look significantly longer at either test tIial type (new recipient M = 13.06, SD= 5.50; new
10cationM= 14.68, SD = 5.58; F< 1, ns). A Fisher's exact test confirmed these
analyses; habituators were more likely to look longer at new recipient trials (all seven
habituators looked longer at new recipient trials), whereas non- habituators were more
likely to prefer new path trials (n = 6) than new recipient trials (n = 3), p = .01.
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Figure 17: Ten- to 12-month-old infants' mean looking times (in seconds) to the mean
oflast two viewed habituation trials and each test trial type in Experiment 4. Data are
presented separately for the entire sample, infants who met the habituation criterion, and
infants who did not meet the habituation criterion.
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Looking Time Recovery Analyses
Directional paired t-tests examined whether infants selectively recovered looking
time to new recipient test trials. These analyses were performed separately on the group
that met the habituation criterion and the group that did not. Habituators looked
significantly longer at new recipient trials (M = 18.22, SD = 7.62) compared to the
average of the last two viewed habituation trials (M = 12.30, SD = 4.64), t(6) = 4.90, p <
.005, d' = .67. In contrast, there was a significant decrease in looking to new path test
trials (M = 9.65, SD = 4.29), t(6) = -2.07,p < .05, d' = .52. Non-habituators had non-
significant decreases to both new recipient test trials (M= 13.07, SD = 5.57) and new
location test trials (M= 14.68, SD = 5.58), compared to the last two habituation trials (M
= 20.02, SD = 13.23), ts < 1.2, ns, ds < .45.
Discussion
In Experiment 4, infants saw an actor give an object to one of two people; in
question was whether infants would construe the gist of the event as a directional push or
as a dyadic interaction. Although, overall, infants did not show any systematic tendency
to construe the action in either of these ways, there was a stark difference between the
looking preferences of infants who reached the habituation criterion and those who did
not. Infants who reached the habituation criterion looked longer during the habituation
phase and subsequently preferred to look at new recipient test trials than at new location
test trials, selectively dishabituating to the former. This pattern suggests that these
infants processed the action at the more abstract of the two possible gist levels, as
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evidenced by their apparent ability to encode the identity of the recipient in the object
transfer event, his or her role in the interaction, and keying in on the change to one of the
participants in the interaction as representing a change in gist. Infants who did not reach
the habituation criterion did not prefer either test trial type.
The observed difference between infants who did and did not reach the
habituation criterion is concordant with the observations of theorists who argue that
whether infants meet the criterion can result in predicable changes in looking time
patterns to test trials (e.g., Cohen, 2004; Hunter & Ames, 1988). As Cohen and Cashon
(2006) note, infants who do not habituate are likely to show familiarity preferences at
test, and the probability of that happening rises when stimulus complexity increases. The
stimuli in the current study were quite complex when compared to other studies of infant
social cognition that often show infants animated shapes against a simple background
(Gergely et aI., 1995; Kuhlmeier et aI., 2003) or just the arms of the actor (Woodward,
1998). Very few experiments involving infants 12-months-of-age or younger have
shown infants dyadic interactions between two people (e.g., Experiments 1, 2a, and 2b in
this dissertation; Sodian et aI., 2004), and fewer yet (e.g., Robertson & Suci, 1980) have
shown infants events involving three people. Given this complexity, it is not surprising
that infants who were more engaged throughout the habituation phase and who eventually
reached the habituation criterion showed a strong preference for test actions depicting a
change in recipient, whereas infants who were less engaged and failed to habituate did
not show any clear patterns at test. The complexity of the actions shown in Experiment 4
relative to Experiments 1, 2a, and 2b may also explain why meeting the habituation
92
criterion was not a factor in the previous experiments, but was a critical factor in the
current experiment.
The current findings could shed light on the results from Experiments I and 2a.
In the habituation phase of those studies, infants saw an actor either push a glass toward
another person or pull it toward herself. At test, infants tended to look longer when the
actor contacted the object in such a way that would only allow her to move the glass in
the opposite direction as seen in habituation. That infants showed this pattern in the face
of substantial perceptual variability between the habituation and test actions attests to the
their ability to process action for gist. The precise nature of that gist, however, was
unclear. Infants could have interpreted the actions in terms of either the direction of
motion (i.e., push versus pull) or the nature of the social interaction (i.e., give versus
take). The current experiment suggests that not only are 10- to l2-month-old infants
capable of extracting the gist of a dyadic interaction, but also that, at least when these
processing strategies would predict conflicting construals of the test action, 10- to 12-
month-old infants prefer to categorize the action on the basis of the more abstract gist
(cf., Cohen & Cashon, 2006; Cohen et aI., 2002). Based on these findings, one could
speculate that to the degree that infants saw the actions in Experiments 1 and 2a as social
interactions, they processed the gist of the actions in genuinely dyadic terms-i.e., as give
versus take. Of course, these two gist-level construals are not mutually exclusive; infants
could have simultaneously interpreted the gist at multiple levels. However, what the
current findings demonstrate is that 10- to 12-month-old infants are capable of
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representing the more abstract of those two gist-related levels, and privilege that
representation when categorizing action exemplars.
If this interpretation is correct, and infants are inclined to process object transfer
events in genuinely dyadic telIDs, then the current findings are the first to my knowledge
to demonstrate this skill within the first year oflife. Research investigating infants'
understanding of dyadic human actions involving one person giving an object to a
recipient has often focused on infants in the second year oflife (e.g., Golinkoff & Kerr,
1978; Robertson & Suci, 1980; Scherf & Tabb, 2005). Clearly, however, any
conclusions regarding infants' construal of the dyadic nature of these interactions must be
tentative. It is not clear, for instance, that infants encoded the fact that the recipient was
human; it is possible that infants would show the same pattern of results if they saw an
actor push the toy to one of two salient objects. The argument that infants' representation
of the action was genuinely social would rest on findings that infants only encoded the
identity ofthe recipient if the recipient was a human rather than an inert object or
mechanical claw. Nonetheless, the hypothesis that 10- to 12-month-old infants are
capable of representing human interaction in dyadic terms is consistent with a growing
body of research suggesting that infants of this age experience rapid and profound
changes in their social cognitive skills (Csibra et aI., 2003; Gergely et aI., 1995;
Kuhlmeier et aI., 2003; Meltzoff, 2007; Moore & Corkum, 1994; Povinelli, 2001;
Sommerville et aI., in press; Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, &
Moll, 2005; Tomasello & Haberl, 2003; Woodward, 2003; Woodward & Guajardo,
2002). The CUlTent findings therefore provide additional weight to the argument that
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infants in previous experiments were capable of interpreting the actions at the relatively
rich level of gist that incorporates the dyadic nature of the interaction.
The findings from Experiment 4 demonstrate that infants as young as 10- to 12-
months-of-age are skilled at glossing over substantial variability in surface detail when
processing human action. In order to construe new location test actions as similar in gist
to the habituation action, and to construe new recipient test trials as dissimilar in gist,
infants had to gloss over changes to the number of hands the actor used to make contact
with the object, the absence of any eye-contact in test trials that would help infants
establish the likely recipient, the path of arm movement, the nature of the hand
configuration at the moment of contact, and the absence of object motion. Although the
test phase of studies in infant social cognition are always perceptually distinct, the
differences tend to comparatively small (e.g., changes to the path of motion, Biro &
Leslie, 2007; Csibra, 2008; Woodward, 1999) to the differences in the current
experiment. Despite the multitude of changes to surface motion details, infants were
nonetheless able to infer the likely recipient of the object in test trials, home in on the gist
of the dyadic interaction, and compare it with the gist of action observed in habituation
trials. Due to the experimental design, infants could have glossed over changes to the
person sitting on a given side of the table in order to process the gist of the action as a
directional push, or they could have glossed over changes to the spatial location of the
object motion in order to process the gist of the action as a dyadic interaction. The
current findings indicate that infants used the latter strategy, which points to their
cognitive flexibility in recognizing which features of an action display are critical for
identifying the gist, and also their tendency to favor more abstract gist--level
representations over relatively less abstract gist-level representations_
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CHAPTER VII
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Overview
In order to make sense out of evanescent, often frenetic, and perceptually variable
displays of human action, infants must be able to efficiently attend to appropriate surface
details while glossing over some aspects ofthe motion stream, all the while attempting to
identify the gist ofthe action. The key goal of the experiments reported here was to
examine 5- to 7- and 10- to 12-month-old infants' ability to extract the gist ofobserved
and inferred actions, to gloss over the substantial surface-level perceptual variability
between multiple action exemplars, and to categorize actions based on similarities in gist.
It was predicted that infants in the older group would demonstrate gist-level processing
when observing several types of action. As predicted, across four experiments-with the
exception of one condition in Experiment 2a and infants who did not habituate in
Experiment 3-10- to 12-month-old infants routinely looked longer at test trials in which
the gist of an inferred action was inconsistent with the gist of an action shown in the
habituation phase than at test trials in which the inferred gist was consistent with the gist
of actions shown in habituation. This effect was observed despite the fact that the actions
depicted in both gist-consistent and gist-inconsistent test trials were equally perceptually
dissimilar to the actions depicted in the habituation phase. After reviewing the results
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from each of the experiments in more detail and drawing some conclusions regarding
what they indicate about gist-level processing, I will discuss some contributions these
findings make to the literature on infants' social cognition, and end by outlining
directions for future research.
Summary of Findings
Experiment 1 examined whether 5- to 7- and 10- to 12-month-old infants could
process pushing and pulling actions for gist. During the habituation phase, half ofthe
infants in each age group saw an actor grasp a glass and push it to another person, and the
other half of infants saw the actor grasp the glass and pull it toward herself. At test, all
infants saw trials in which the actor contacted the glass with a perceptually distinct hand
configuration that would enable her to push-but not pull-the glass, as well as other
trials in which the actor contacted the glass with a perceptually distinct hand
configuration that would enable her to pull-but not push-the glass. In neither test
video did the actor move the glass. Ten- to 12-month-old infants who saw the actor push
the glass in the habituation phase looked longer at the first presentation of test trials in
which the actor was poised to pull the glass toward herself, whereas 10- to 12-month-old
infants who saw the pull event in habituation looked longer at the first presentation oftest
tIials in which the actor was poised to push the glass away from herself and toward
another person. These findings indicate that 10- to 12-month-old infants are able to
extract the gist ofboth observed and inferred actions and, despite perceptual
dissimilarities between the various actions, categorize them on the basis of a shared gist.
98
In contrast, among the 5- to 7-month-old sample, infants who saw the push event in
habituation showed similar patterns as the older infants, whereas infants who saw the pull
event in habituation did not prefer either test trial type. These findings suggest that gist-
level action processing strategies may be online by the sixth month of life.
Experiment 2a attempted to replicate the findings from the older infants in
Experiment 1 while introducing three methodological changes--playing background
music, decreasing the delay between action presentations within a trial, and instituting a
three-second still-frame pause at the end of test trials-all of which were aimed at
increasing 11- to 12-month-old infants' visual attention throughout the experiment.
Results from infants in the observed-pull condition replicated findings from Experiment
1, but infants in the observed-push condition did not look longer at either test trial type.
One possibility for this pattern is that observed-push habituation trials depicted an action
with a continuous, unidirectional motion trajectory, leading infants who saw that action
during the habituation phase to be surprised by both test trials because they introduced a
lengthy pause in the middle of the motion stream.
Experiment 2b attempted to replicate the findings from the younger infants in
Experiment 1 using a methodology nearly identical to that used in Experiment 2a.
However, due to the possibility that the three-second pause differentially affected
perceptual processing between infants in the two habituation conditions, test trials were
followed by a one-second still-frame pause as in Experiment 1. Despite this
methodological improvement, results from this experiment were inconclusive, as infants
in the observed-push condition looked significantly longer throughout the entire
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experiment than infants in the observed-pull condition. No differences were seen in
infants' looking to the two test trial types.
Experiment 3 addressed the question of whether or not processing for gist is a
strategy that 10- to 12-month-old infants use when interpreting actions involving other
objects and body positions than those involved in the prior studies. Half of the infants in
Experiment 3 saw an actor open an oven door in the habituation phase, and half saw the
actor close the door. In test, all infants saw the actor make contact with the door in a
manner that would enable him to open-but not close-the door, and other trials in
which the contact was made in a manner that would enable him to close-but not open-
the door. Infants who saw the open event in habituation looked longer at test trials in
which the actor was poised to close the door, whereas infants who saw the close event in
habituation looked longer at test trials in which the actor was poised to open the door. As
in the preceding experiments, infants had to make a genuinely generative inference based
on a perceptually novel act, extract the gist of the inferred action, and categorize the gist
of the inferred act along with the gist of the observed action observed during the
habituation phase. These results suggest that infants process opening and closing
actions-at least those performed by pushing or pulling a door-for gist, and they
represent a first step in examining whether processing for gist is a general strategy that
infants use when interpreting human action.
Experiment 4 examined whether 10- to 12-month-olds can process action for gist
when several motion parameters beyond hand configuration and the absence of object
motion varied between habituation and test action exemplars. Moreover, Experiment 4
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examined whether infants prefer to categorize actions on the basis of a more abstract
level of gist relative to a less abstract level of gist. Infants in Experiment 4 saw an actor
give an object to one of two people, who were seated on either side of a table. At test, the
recipient and an observer were seated on opposite sides ofthe table as they were seated in
habituation trials. On alternating test trials, the actor either contacted the object using a
novel hand configuration as if to push it to a new location, but to the same recipient, or
contacted the object as if to push it to a new recipient who was on the same side of the
table as where the object was moved in habituation trials. Infants who reached the
habituation criterion looked longer at test trials in which the actor contacted the object as
if to push it to a new recipient. Infants who did not reach the habituation criterion did not
show a preference between the two test trial types. The findings from habituators
corroborated findings from the previous experiments-that is, that infants can infer future
actions, can gloss over substantial differences in perceptual information between action
exemplars, and can categorize actions based on shared gist-and extended those findings
by demonstrating infants' ability to gloss over changes to several motion parameters and
to categorize action at a more abstract level of gist which incorporates the actor, object
motion, and the recipient of the object. Furthermore, these findings provide suggestive
evidence that at least some infants process action in terms of the specific individuals
involved in a dyadic interaction.
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The Nature and Development of Processing for Gist
In the introduction to this dissertation, processing for gist was proposed to
comprise at least three components: (A) identifying the functional affordance--or gist-
of the action; (B) glossing over gist-irrelevant surface-level features of the motion stream
(except when the gist is not easily identified, in which case the observer once again bases
his or her interpretation of the action on surface details); and (C) categorizing both
observed and inferred action based on the more abstract gist level rather than on low-
level surface features.
Results from four experiments provide support for the hypothesis that by the end
of the first year of life, infants process action in concordance with each of these
components. In Experiments 1 and 3,10- to 12-month-old infants' construal oftest
events was driven by the action they had seen in habituation. Only actions that provided
the actor with a functional affordance that was dissimilar to the action seen in habituation
elicited increased visual attention, thus supporting (A). Looking time to a single test
video appeared to be driven by its gist-level similarity to the actions shown in
habituation, despite substantial perceptual variability between the actions, thus supporting
(B). That infants showed this preference rather than recovering attention to each
perceptually novel test stimulus provides support for (C). These findings were equally
true for each of the test events in each of the conditions in Experiments 1 and 4. Similar
evidence was provided by infants in the observed-pull condition of Experiment 2a and
habituators in Experiment 4. In fact, 10- to 12-month-old infants throughout all four
experiments showed the predicted pattern, save two exceptions: infants in the observed-
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push condition in Experiment 2a and non-habituators in Experiment 4. Speculations as to
what each of these exceptions may indicate about the nature and development of gist-
related processing are included in the future directions section below.
Tentative support for a richer interpretation of (C) comes from Experiment 4.
Infants could have construed the actions at two levels of gist. At the less abstract level,
infants may have glossed over changes to the hand configuration and motion trajectory,
focusing instead on the spatial location to which the actor moved the object. At the more
abstract level, they may have also encoded each partner in the dyadic interaction. When
these two gist-related construals of an action were possible, infants who habituated
appeared to give encoding preference to the more abstract of the two gist levels for
categorizing the actions (cf., Cohen et aI., 2002). On this richer interpretation of (C),
infants' preference for gist-level representations when categorizing actions would not
necessarily be due to a distinction between perceptual and gist-level analyses, per se, but
rather to the privileged status of more abstract representations over less abstract
representations.
Conclusions regarding this richer interpretation of (C), however, are tentative due
to a caveat regarding the presence of this effect in only half of the sample of Experiment
4. Unlike in the other experiments, which suggest that infants at the end of the first year
typically process action for gist, infants in Experiment 4 were divided into two groups.
The first group comprised the [roughly] half of infants who were highly attentive
throughout the habituation phase, met the habituation criterion, and universally appeared
to encode the dyadic nature of the object transfer event. The second group comprised the
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other half of infants who were far less attentive in habituation, did not meet the
habituation criterion, and showed no preference for either test trial type. This caveat
notwithstanding, the differences between infants who did and did not habituate are
predictable in light of proposals regarding domain-general information processing
mechanisms (Cohen & Cashon, 2006). As a stimulus increases in complexity, as was the
case with the actions depicted in Experiment 4, infants are more likely to become
overloaded with information, causing them to regress to a lower level of analysis. It is
not surprising, therefore, that only the infants who appeared to show heightened attention
to the actions were able to move to more abstract levels of analysis. Whether this reflects
individual differences in gist-level processing, or whether it simply reflects the amount of
attention devoted to habituation trials, remains a question for future research. In the
future directions section below, I return to this question regarding the relevance of the
current work to research on individual differences in social cognition.
The above discussion begs the ontogenetic question: what are the developmental
mechanisms that allow 10- to l2-month-old infants to process action for gist with a
sophistication-or at least a consistency-that is lacking in 5- to 7-month-old infants? If
the description of gist-related processing offered above is correct, and gist-level
processing differs from purely surface-level processing in the level of abstraction needed
to form the representation, then it is unlikely that the locus of the developmental change
lies in a newfound ability to form abstractions. After all, research on infant
categorization has shown that 3-month-olds are capable of forming abstract object
categories (French et aL, 2004). One possible explanation for this developmental
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progression is that domain general changes in infants' information processing strategies
enable them to process additional dimensions of perceptual input, which then leads to the
creation of categories that incorporate more elements. Infants~as well as older
children~will be better able to form abstract representations of human behavior as they
are increasingly able to hold more information in mind (Halford, 1982) and process that
information quickly and efficiently (Carlson, Mandell, & Williams, 2004; Case, 1992),
particularly in cases where the event spans greater periods of time (Halford, 1993).
These skills would undoubtedly help infants attend to a multitude of action
characteristics. They would be better able to monitor whether joint attention has been
established between two or more people, encode the identity of the actor, monitor her
hand configuration, use that hand configuration to predict the direction of object motion,
encode the identity of the recipient and monitor his interaction with the object, all the
while monitoring the relationships between these elements and attempting to identify the
gist of the action.
This proposal is intended to complement, rather than replace, current theories
regarding developmental mechanisms. It could still be the case-and the mounting
evidence suggests that it is-that infants' own sensorimotor experience drives changes in
their ability to interpret other people's actions via a "like me" mapping system (Meltzoff,
2007; Piaget, 1952; Sommerville et aI., 2005; Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello et aI., 2005).
In other words, domain-general developments need not preclude domain-specific ones.
Identifying the role of information processing advances in enabling the creation ofmore
abstract action representations simply provides an explanation for why older infants may
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be able more efficiently sort through the perceptual input (Halford, 1993) and generate
abstract, gist-level representations.
Contributions
The package of results presented in the current experiments adds to the literature
on infant social cognition. Building on previous research that has demonstrated infants'
robust ability to gloss over some perceptual aspects of a motion display, such as the path
of a reach (Woodward, 1998; Phillips & Wellman, 2005) or the path of self-propelled
motion toward a goal location (Gergely et aI., 1995), the current research suggests that
infants can contend with changes to the hand configuration used to contact objects, to the
presence of object motion (even when the gist ofthe action involves moving an object),
and to the location toward which an object will be pushed in order to reach a recipient
(Experiment 4). Furthermore, by demonstrating that infants process action for gist across
three sets of stimuli comprising two action comparisons (object transfer and opening
versus closing a door), the results presented in this dissertation make a compelling case
for gist-level processing as a skill that infants generally employ when interpreting human
action.
Beyond simply demonstrating that infants can gloss over more types of action
parameters than previously demonstrated, these experiments also provide evidence that
infants can gloss over some surface-level motion details in an entirely different way
relative to what has previously been demonstrated. In prior research, care was taken to
ensure that perceptual components critical for action identification were held constant
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between habituation and test. For instance, in research on infants' understanding of
grasps (Buresh & Woodward, 2007; Sommerville & Woodward, 2005a; Todd & Smith,
2008; Woodward, 1998), the configuration ofthe hand while grasping was identical
between habituation and test actions. In research on infants' understanding of self-
propelled human motion toward a goal state (Kamewari et al., 2005; Phillips & Wellman,
2005; Sodian et al., 2004), the beginning and ending of actions were identical in
habituation and test actions; only the path taken was changed. In all of this research,
perceptual features that allowed the observer to categorize the action were held constant
throughout the study. Grasps were always clearly grasps, and infants' task was to assess
which components of clearly-identified grasps were critical and which could be glossed
over-e.g., the object grasped versus the location in which the grasping took place.
In contrast, infants in the current research did not have the benefit of consistent
surface-level motion details-e.g., hand configuration and object motion-that would
allow them to easily recognize that the actions in test were the same as habituation.
Pushing events in habituation looked little like the pushing events shown in test. Based
on an analysi~ that utilized surface-level details exclusively, the two test events would be
seen as closer to each other than to the habituation action. For instance, both test actions
in Experiment 1 depicted contact with the glass using an angled palm, both of which
would be seen as equally dissimilar to the habituation event in which the actor grasped
the glass using a cupping hand configuration. Thus, a purely surface-level perceptual
analysis ofhabituation and test actions would not be sufficient to group those actions in a
single category. Unlike in previous research where the perceptual similarities between
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habituation and test actions allowed easy categorization-e.g., every grasp was clearly a
grasp-infants in the current experiments had to rely on their ability to interpret hand
configuration cues as potentiating some motions but not others, infer those actions, fonn
a gist-based representation of the inferred action, and only then be able to categorize
habituation and test actions together at the gist level. In other words, whereas previous
research has pointed to infants' ability to categorize actions and then interpret them, the
current research demonstrates that infants can, in a sense, interpret actions and then
categorize them.
The current experiments also make gains in promoting ecological validity within
the literature on infant social cognition. In the interest of experimental control, many
previous experiments have used computer generated shapes that appear agentive (Heider
& Simmel, 1944) in order to construct the action stimuli shown to infants (Gergely et aI.,
1995; Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003). When human action has been shown, great
lengths have been taken to simplify the display (but see Baldwin et aI., 2001, for a
notable exception). Often, only the actor's arm is visible (Woodward, 1998). When the
actor is shown, it is often from the waist-up, seated in front of a blank wall (Phillips &
Wellman, 2005; Sommerville & Woodward, 2005a). In most of this research that has
used exemplars of human action, infants' looking time was measured to the statically-
presented endpoint of an action (e.g., Woodward 1998). Simplified displays of human
action, some features of which were also employed in some of the experiments reported
here, are often necessary to ensure that infants' attention is drawn toward the relevant
information.
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Despite the necessity of experimental control, the simplified nature of the stimuli
used in these studies raises questions about whether infants are capable of using the
processing skills uncovered by laboratory tests when analyzing chaotic, perceptually
variable, and evanescent human action in the real world. Therefore, it is critical that
some research examines infants' processing with more ecologically valid stimuli.
Throughout the current research, steps in this direction were taken. For instance, in all of
the experiments reported in this dissertation, infants' looking times were measured to
ongoing human action rather than to static displays. If infants are to successfully
interpret real-world action, they must be able to interpret ongoing action; an action
processing mechanism that could only operate on displays of statically-presented
endstates would have a difficult time making sense out of evanescent human action.
The complexity of the events was also increased by presenting infants with
actions carried out in environments containing visual clutter (Experiment 3), interactions
between two people (Experiments 1, 2a, 2b), or a dyadic interaction between two of three
people (Experiment 4). Considering the complexity of real-world actions, the stimuli
used throughout the experiments in this dissertation increase the ecological validity of the
research. This increase in ecological validity did not come at the cost of experimental
control, however, as the use of videotaped stimuli allowed several perceptual features to
be strictly controlled. Within each experiment, the habituation stimuli used in each
condition were always equal in overall length and also in the relative amount of time it
took for each action component to be completed; the same was true when comparing test
stimuli within an experiment. The balance of ecological validity and experimental
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control throughout the experiments in this dissertation allows for increased confidence in
extrapolating the findings from these laboratory tasks to the action processing strategies
infants use in their everyday lives.
Speculations and Future Directions
Several promising avenues for future research grow out of the results reported
here. Infants in the current set of experiments displayed an ability to categorize actions at
the gist level by the end of the first year. These findings raise interesting questions about
the development of a system that comprises multiple gist-related levels, as there clearly
are many potential abstract levels on which an observer can categorize an action.
Observers can form hierarchies that comprise several levels of goals and sub-goals that
are involved in task completion (Hard et aI., 2006; Zacks & Swallow, 2007; Zacks &
Tversky, 2001; Zacks et aI., 2001) and identify some of those action components as more
critical to the task than other components (Jackendoff, 2007; Reed, Montgomery,
Schwartz, Palmer, & Pittenger, 1992). Observers are also able to make inferences about
the actor's goals (Woodward, 1998; Woodward & Sommerville, 2000) and intentions
(Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998; Meltzoff, 1995) and even traits that may have
motivated the behavior (Holbrook, 2007; Malle, 2004). Despite the processing skills
displayed by infants in the current set of experiments, research has shown that even older
children fall short in understanding many of these more abstract concepts, such as the
representational mental states of others (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983). A fruitful topic for
future longitudinal research will be to investigate whether the abstract processing skills
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documented in the current research are precursors to these later developments in
representing action at abstract levels (cf., Woodward et aI., 2001).
Although very little longitudinal work has directly examined such questions
regarding the continuity of infant social cognition, recent research by Wellman and
colleagues (Wellman, Lopez-Duran, LaBounty, & Hamilton, 2008; Wellman, Phillips,
Dunphy-Lelii, & LaLonde, 2004) has begun to look at whether infants' social cognitive
prowess, as measured by looking-time techniques, predicts theory of mind developments
in preschool. Some of the current findings may provide solutions for methodological
issues that have proved problematic in these previous studies. For instance, in Wellman
and colleagues' (2004) attempt to see if infant looking time measures predicted preschool
social cognition, the same 14-month-old infants who participated in Phillips, Wellman,
and Spelke's (2002) study were given a battery of theory ofmind tests at 4-years-of-age.
Unfortunately, there was minimal variation within the looking time data in the Phillips et
al. research as the majority of 14-month-old infants behaved similarly well in the looking
time task. Wellman et al. (2004) did not find any relationship between children's
performance in the test phase of the infant looking time task and the theory of mind tests
when the children were preschool age, a null finding that they hypothesized may have
been due to the lack of variation in the infant looking time data.
In a more recent study, Wellman and colleagues (2008) used a group of 10- to 12-
month-old infants who were not expected to perform as well on the social cognition
looking time task based on results from Phillips et al. (2002). The authors predicted that
the data from these younger infants would provide greater variability with which to
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predict future performance on the theory of mind tasks. This manipulation was partially
successful, as looking time patterns in the habituation phase were predictive of
developments in theory of mind, but interestingly, performance at test was not. Thus,
while those data suggest that attention to social displays predicts later social cognitive
developments, critical questions regarding the stability of the quality of their action
processing skills, and the lack of predictive power from test performance, remain
puzzlingly unclear. The findings from Experiment 4 may be useful in addressing this
confusion in future research. That habituators and non-habituators in Experiment 3
displayed stark differences throughout the habituation and test phases suggests that the
methodology tapped in to substantive processing variation between infants. To my
knowledge, no other study in the literature on infant action processing has found such a
clear, data-driven method for breaking infants into two groups that differ on displayed
social-cognitive skills. Therefore, by using a task such as that employed in Experiment 3,
it would be possible to test for individual differences using a between-subjects
comparison rather than a correlational one, which might avoid some of the problems due
to restricted variability in infant .looking-time measures.
Results from the current experiments demonstrate infants' gist-level processing of
actions involving object transfer as well as opening and closing a door. That infants have
demonstrated this ability across multiple action categories strengthens the argument that
gist-level processing is a strategy infants generally use when processing action. Future
research should attempt to further delineate actions for which infants demonstrate gist-
level processing. For example, would infants show similar skills when observing each
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step in a means-end sequence (Sommerville & Woodward, 2005a; Woodward &
Sommerville, 2000)? Given the wide range of actions infants observe, research
identifying which action types infants can process for gist at which ages will provide
important evidence on the development of social cognition.
Another possible direction to take this research is to investigate the relation
between surface-level processing and gist processing. Two unexpected findings suggest
this as a fruitful direction for future research. It is important to note that because each of
these findings was unexpected, the interpretation I offer here is just one of many possible
post-hoc accounts. Nonetheless, these findings may open up interesting lines of research
in that they converge on the conclusion that attention to surface detail is an important
component of gist-level processing. After a review of each of these findings, I discuss
what those findings may indicate about the role of bottom-up processing mechanisms and
how this line of research would enrich the field of infant social cognition.
The first suggestive finding comes from 5- to 7-month-old infants in Experiment
1, who were predicted to show elevated attention to both test trial types, which would be
indicative of sensitivity to changes in the surface-level perceptual components of the
motion stream. Surprisingly, infants in the observed-push condition instead displayed a
pattern indicative of gist-level processing, looking longer at inferred-pull trials than
inferred-push trials. Infants in the observed-pull condition showed the predicted pattern
of increased attention to both test trial types. A key difference between the actions shown
in the habituation phase of these two conditions is in motion continuity: in the push
action, the actor's arm movements were continuous-all of the motion moved away from
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her body-whereas in the pull action, half ofthe motion moved away from her body as
she reached for the glass and half ofthe motion was toward her body as she retrieved it.
Five- to 7-month-old infants in the observed-pull condition may have had a difficult time
construing the motion away from the body as the means to the more important end-·i.e.,
pulling-while identifying the second action component involving a motion trajectory
toward the body as more important to gist-related processing. Compared with this
bidirectional pulling action, infants in the observed-push condition may have had an
easier time processing the continuous, unidirectional motion stream depicted in the
pushing action. If this explanation of the condition differences in test performance is
correct, it would suggest that infants are continually attentive to the available perceptual
information, and that when infants cannot sort through the perceptual information in an
efficient manner in order to identify the key action components (cf, Reed et aI., 1992),
they are unable to form gist-level representations.
The unexpected condition differences among 11- to 12-month-old infants in
Experiment 2a likewise point to the importance of bottom-up processing when extracting
the gist of human action. This explanation also points to the differential perceptual
complexity of the actions shown in the habituation phase: the pushing actions were
unidirectional and continuous, whereas the pulling actions were bidirectional and
discontinuous. Although neither habituation action contained an actual pause in the
motion stream, the change in motion direction in the pulling action introduced a
discontinuity and may have led infants who saw that action in habituation to expect an
interruption to the outward trajectory of the hand, while infants who saw the pushing
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action would not expect an interruption. In the test trials of Experiment 2a, the actor
paused for three seconds after making contact with the object. On a purely surface-,level
analysis of the action, the presence of a three-second discontinuity in the motion stream
would seem novel to infants who had seen the continuous pushing action in the
habituation phase. In line with this observation, infants in the observed-push condition
did not prefer either test trial type, suggesting that the introduction of a lengthy pause in
both test trials struck them as noteworthy. In contrast, among infants in the observed-pull
condition, for whom a motion discontinuity was familiar, the lengthy pause did not
interfere with their gist-level processing, as evidenced by their longer looking at inferred-
push test trials than inferred-pull test trials. This effect may not have been present in
Experiment 1 due to the relatively short one-second pause at the end of still frame trials
in that experiment.
Together, the findings from 5- to 7-month-old infants in Experiment 1 and the
findings from 11- to l2-month-old infants in Experiment 2a suggest infants are
continually attentive to surface-level details of the motion stream even as they attempt to
form gist-based representations of the action. Put another way, infants seem to exploit
surface properties to inform a gist-level analysis. When the available perceptual
information is too complex, infants-and adults as well-may not be able to achieve a
gist-level analysis, and contradictory perceptual information (e.g., a discontinuity in the
motion stream is introduced where it would be unexpected) may actively impede infants'
construction of a gist-level interpretation of action.
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Increased attention to the important role of bottom-up mechanisms would fill a
gap in the extant literature, which has traditionally looked to other factors for ontogenetic
accounts of social cognition. Specifically, a lively current debate in the literature centers
on whether social cognitive development is driven by action experience and sensorimotor
developments (Meltzoff, 2007; Rochat & Striano, 1998; Rochat, 2001; Sommerville et
al., in press; Sommerville & Woodward, 2005b; Sommerville et al., 2005; Tomasello,
1999), or whether such advances reflect the maturation of abstract action processing
principles (Csibra et al., 2003; Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Johnson, 2003; Kiraly et al.,
2003) and domain specific modules (Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004; Premack &
Premack, 1997). While few, if any, of these proposals would deny the importance of
perceptual processing, the role of bottom-up processing mechanisms has not been in the
forefront of this debate. In much of the previous research, surface-level complexity of
the motion stream was treated as a source of noise obscuring researchers' ability to
answer other questions. As such, perceptual motion features were controlled either by
strictly dictating the pace of human action and the precise movements involved, or by
omitting human actors entirely in favor of simple, easily controlled computerized shapes.
Of course, given that the question of interest in this research was related to infants'
understanding of goals or principles that underlie human action, such rigorous
experimental control of perceptual complexity has been necessary.
However, when one takes a broader view of infant social cognition and asks how
infants make sense out of everyday human action, one must ask how infants take the
available information, fraught with perceptual noise though it may be, and process it for
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gist. Three findings from this dissertation all point to the importance of bottom-up
processing in forming gist-level representations of action: (1) 5·· to 7-month-old infants in
Experiment 1 demonstrated gist-level processing for pushing actions only, (2) there were
condition differences in test performance among the 11- to 12-month-old infants in
Experiment 2a, and (3) when complex stimuli were presented to 11- to 12··month-old
infants in Experiment 3, habituators and non-habituators perfOlmed differently. Each of
these findings suggests that bottom-up processing of surface-level motion details can
influence infants' ability to process action for gist (see also Carlson, Mandell et aI., 2004;
Carlson, Moses, & Claxton, 2004; and Moses, 2005, for similar proposals regarding the
importance of domain-general processes to social cognition). This broad view of infant
social cognition and the suggestive results from this dissertation both suggest that a
productive direction for future research would be to probe how bottom-up and abstract
processing mechanisms operate concurrently and in tandem (Baird & Baldwin, 2001;
Baldwin, 2005; Povinelli, 2001; Tomasello, 1999).
Conclusion
Human action in everyday life varies based on the context, the objects involved,
the position of the body in relation to the manipulated objects, and the degree to which an
observer has visual access to each of these components. Faced with this variability, it is
important that infants gloss over changes to surface-level perceptual features inherent in
ongoing, evanescent human action in order to identify the meaning-or gist-of the
action. The experiments presented in this dissertation demonstrate that by 10- to 12-
months-of-age, and possibly by 5- to 7-months-of-age, infants engage in gist-level
processing of a range of human actions. These findings provide some of the first
evidence of infants' ability to cope with the rampant perceptual variability inherent in
human action and engender several promising directions for future research.
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